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The Races and Peoples of South-east Asia

by BERTIL LUNDMAN*

I

Now we move to a region with usually abundant summer rains. This fact has favored the cultural development of the area to a high degree. It is probably more meaningful to divide the area into two sub-regions: the mainland, except the Malacca peninsula, on the one side—and the remaining region up to the border of Oceania, above all, New Guinea.

The linguistic distribution is on the whole rather simple. One exception is the linguistic affinity of some of the still almost unexplored smaller tribal groups in the interior of Indo-China. Farthest to the northeast we have three languages, each of which stands by itself: the Ainu, the Japanese, and the Korean. The great Sino-Tibetan language family today dominates almost the entire mainland, apart from certain areas in Indo-China. There some scattered languages of the Austro-Asiatic language family are spoken. These languages, however, are now being displaced by languages of the Sino-Tibetan family. In Indonesia languages of the Austronesian language family are exclusively in use. Only on the easternmost islands, above all on the Moluccas, are languages spoken which are isolated or possibly related to the West Papuan languages.

II

Different types of the hypsicephalic or high-skulled Southeast-Mongolid racial group are encountered everywhere in Japan (excluding the Ainu), Korea and China, and also in the larger parts of Indo-China and Indonesia. In Indonesia, however, they are mixed in places with older, more primitive races. The high-headedness of the Chinese in contrast to the peoples of Central Asia was well-known to them since ancient times!

The Japanese language is considered by some students to be related to the Tungusic as well as to the Korean languages. However, the relationship is not firm to either of these two languages. Perhaps Japanese, and also Korean, is a form of polished, hybrid language. Anthropologically, the Japanese most resemble the South Chinese. In the best rice-growing regions the Japanese are predominantly South Chinese or Malaid (the

* Translated from the German by Donald A. Swan.

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so-called "Satsuma"-type) in racial type. The inhabitants of the mountain regions of Japan are more long-headed and narrower-faced. These Japanese, however, show less frequent but more certain Ainu traits (such traits even appeared in the case of Emperor Mutsuhito).

The Ainus are the original inhabitants of the Japanese Islands, although there may once have been Negritos on the southern islands. The Ainus are nowadays often strongly mixed with Mongolic elements. However, it is evident that they have always been rather polymorphic. Some Ainus seem almost North Indid in appearance—with narrow noses and in part also narrow faces. Other Ainus appear more Australid—with thick lips and very broad faces (but not Mongolid).

To return to the Japanese, there are also among them, especially in the old nobility, very narrow-faced individuals with narrow, arched noses, but still a more or less Mongolid position of the eyes. This is the so-called "Choshu"-type, or more correctly the "Jakunin"-type. This type is also present, but to a smaller degree, in most of the regions of China. Then, there are some, rather scarce, almost light Japanese types with a fairly Nordic-like facial profile.

The Koreans resemble both the Japanese and Chinese. However, they often show a more stocky "boreal" body build. The Koreans are, on the average, more short-headed than the other two East Asian peoples.

III

China is racially much more variegated than one in the West is accustomed to believe. The North Chinese are tall, and in part long-faced and narrow-nosed. The Central Chinese are broader in facial, nasal, and bodily form. Both of these groups, however, are predominantly mesocephalic in head shape. The small, lively South Chinese are mostly brachycephalic. They have Malaid strains, which are evident in the less pronounced Mongolid eye-form. Naturally, there are also in China other, individual types. They even include different Europid racial types in the southwest of China.

The Chinese language exhibits a great abundance of dialects. Among these, moreover, there are in the remote southeast regions of China more rule-governed languages. All this is masked in the written literature with its catchwords, whereby the possibility stands open to everyone to express these in *his* dialect. These catchwords (Wortzeichen) may possibly have originated through Oriental influence diffused over the "silk-routes". The South Chinese probably once spoke other languages—perhaps even belonging in part to other language families. The old

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domesticated animals and cultivated plants of South China—such as the buffalo, pig, dog, silkworm, rice, yam, tea and so on—are distinguished from those of North China.

Westward and southwestward from China, and partly also in the mountains of South China, a multitude of tribes press into one another. So far as is known, these tribes speak languages more or less related to the Chinese. Here maize (corn) was already being cultivated in certain regions shortly after the middle of the sixteenth century. The grain was even cultivated in several varieties. It is thus surprising that some investigators were of the view that this kind of grain became known to the Old World only through the discovery of America. Then, perhaps maize (corn) reached Central America from Southeast Asia with the South Chinese sea voyages around the beginning of the Christian Era. However, there are also investigators who hold that a rapid post-Columbian introduction of this grain is not impossible.

Linguistically the inhabitants of Tibet also belong to this group. The land has many Europid strains. According to the blood group relationships, these strains have mostly come from the west and not from the south—(due to acclimitization difficulties?). Consequently, a Europid influenced Tibetid hybrid-race has been created. This hybrid-race is long-faced and narrow-nosed, but predominantly Mongolid in eye form and hair form—similar to the North Sinids. The same strains are also present in the border regions between Indo-China and Southwest China. Perhaps the Jakunin-types in Japan originated in this region.

IV

Further south, in Indo-China, peoples and tribes from the north have submerged most of the old culture-areas in countless waves—at least during the last millennium. In earlier times peoples speaking Austro-Asiatic languages were the predominant residents of these regions of Indo-China. They had probably migrated to Indo-China across the same routes at a still earlier time in history. These regions of Southeast Asia were later invaded by the Siamese in the fourteenth century and the Burmese in the seventeenth century.

The older peoples of Southeast Asia became strongly influenced by a cultural—and in part also a racial—invasion from India around the beginning of the Christian Era. Shortly thereafter, powerful states were founded in this region. Their major cities with a once legendary splendor now lie abandoned in large part. The famous city of Angkor of the Khmer Empire, located in present-day Cambodia, is one such example.

Here, however, the old Austro-Asiatic language and the old,

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still brachycephalic Khmerid race—which is characterized as half-Veddid and half-Southeast-Mongolid—survive in ever greater number. This is also true in part in Siam. Moreover, there are now only remnants of the Austro-Asiastic language family. These include the Mon language spoken by tribes at the mouth of the Irrawaddy River in Burma and many other places in the mountains further in the interior of the peninsula. Austro-Asiastic languages are also spoken on the distant Nicobar Islands and by the primitive tribes in Malacca. The Annamite language of the east coast of Indo-China is viewed as a typical example of a now homogeneous language of mixed origin.

The racial relations in Indo-China are more complicated than the linguistic relations. Nowadays the Mongolid types are everywhere somewhat in the majority. However, even in the land of Tonkin in the furthest north of Indo-China, the Mongolid types are not so pronounced as in China. The eyelid cleft is not so narrow and slanted. The face is often less flat.

Naturally, the invasions from the north signified a strengthening of the Mongolid portion of the population. However, it appears that Mongolid elements were more or less present—in addition to the Veddid race—even among the older "Austro-Asiatic" peoples. This is also indicated by the presence of a still more evident Mongolid strain than their surroundings in some living-isolated peoples, such as the Munda tribes of northern India. The Diego-factor is even found among these tribal groups.

Within this Southeast-Mongolid basic stock, a contrast becomes especially evident. It is between the pronounced Mongolid type on the fertile plains of Indo-China and the somewhat less pronounced Mongolid type in the mountains. In addition, we have here and there in the mountains dwarfed racial types. Among these types, the whole tribe appears as if it consisted almost entirely of small, robust children! This is evidently the result of a local dwarfing process. Some tribes in southernmost Annam can be viewed as "Polynesian return-migrants." This interpretation receives unexpected support from the high cranial capacity of these tribes. This contrasts completely with the low cranial capacities of the surrounding tribes of this region of Indo-China.

V

Indonesia, together with the Malacca peninsula, has approximately the same cultural and racial history as Indo-China. Linguistically, however, Indonesia is more homogeneous. The only language spoken throughout the islands is Indonesian, which is a branch of the great Austronesian or "South-Sea-Island"

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language family. This language family is distributed throughout the islands of the South Seas—from Madagascar in the west up to Easter Island in the east. The other principal branch of this language family is the Oceanic. Of the many languages and dialects used in these islands, two have attained the character of a great culture-language: Javanese and Malay. The latter was originally spoken only on southern Sumatra and earlier on the Malacca peninsula. However, today Malay is widely distributed in Indonesia as the language of trade and commerce.

Racially, we have seen—as already indicated—correspondences to the stratification of races which we have delineated for Indo-China. We find the more brachycephalic and more strongly Mongolid Malaids in the regions of higher culture and the more dolichocephalic and less pronounced—but still predominantly Mongolid—Dayakids in the less civilized regions in the interior of Indonesia. In some parts of Indonesia very small, dwarfed, strongly Mongolid tribes are to be found.

The Mongolid type, however, is still somewhat more diluted as a rule in Indonesia than in Indo-China. This is especially true of the interior of the island of Borneo. There some of the tribes appear almost entirely Europid, with strikingly light skin color. Furthermore, there does not appear to be any conspicuous primitive stratum of Veddid, or even Negritid, groups.

In addition to the above-named primitive peoples, we find in certain regions of the southwestern islands of Indonesia—above all on Sumatra, Java, and Bali—more or less distinct Indid, and even Gangid, strains. This is a consequence of the migration to these regions of Indonesia of peoples from India. Here, as also in the case of Indo-China, the invaders from India introduced a higher culture and founded in the early post-Christian centuries powerful states.

At the same time, some of the Indo-Melanid Dravidian groups came with the migrants from India. Their share of the invaders can still be observed in the racially-mixed, living populations of these regions of Indonesia. The dominant religion in these areas for several centuries became Hinduism. Later Buddhism reached Indonesia. Towards the end of the Middle Ages, Arab merchants and missionaries succeeded in converting most of the Indonesian peoples to the Islamic religion. Only on the island of Bali has Hinduism maintained its hold on the people up to the present day.

VI

There are in Indonesia countless older and more primitive strains than those found in Indo-China. Above all there are many

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Veddids—especially in the interior of the Malacca peninsula, on the Celebes Islands, and also on the Little Sunda Islands. However, Veddid strains are also intermixed in the peoples of higher culture.

There are also Negrids in Southeast Asia. However, they are to be found almost only as marginal, dwarfed groups (" Negritos ") in the inaccessible regions of the interior of Malacca and in the mountains of most of the Philippine Islands, as well as on the eastern Little Sunda Islands. The natives of the Andaman Islands form an exception to this, so that they still possess a unique, isolated language. To the extent that they have avoided later racial mixtures, the Negritos are often strikingly Negrid in their physical traits, such as: skin color, hair texture, and form of the lips. On the Andaman Islands fatty buttocks (*Fettsteiss*) are also found. In the rest of Indonesia, only weak, almost vanished Negrito strains can be ascertained. The same is true in the south of Indo-China.

Occasionally, the remarkable " Cubiform " type (*not* race) appears in pariah-like groups. This type is characterized by an abnormally elongated face, with almost ape-like, projecting jaws. It is apparently a hereditary, pathological type, although based upon strong mixed-Veddid foundations. Such an extreme prognathism is *very* rare in the rest of the world, except among the even more strongly prognathous Australian aborigines.

The easternmost islands of Indonesia, which are freer from influences of the older High Cultures, harbor some attractive Europid Nesids. These peoples apparently migrated to Indonesia from the Himalayan lands rather early in history—before the mostly Mongolid waves of later migrants. Naturally, there are also some Dayakids and Malaids in these eastern islands. The latter, however, are mostly late migrants. There are also remnants of Veddids and occasionally of Negritos.

Furthermore, the Papuans have established themselves in part as sea-pirates. Isolated from the rest of the islands, they have been brought here earlier as slaves. This is also true of a few Australian aborigines. Some of the later peoples are descendants of Portuguese and Chinese traders. Thus, we have an extremely variegated racial mixture, which has often existed *for a very long time.* As a consequence of the relatively strong inbreeding which followed, the most unusual local types (*Gautypen*) have arisen from these race mixtures. For example, the mean cephalic index among two neighbouring tribes on one of these islands is some 71-72 for one tribe and 88-89 for the other tribe. Yet, there is allegedly no cranial deformation. The same result occurs at times among other groups.

The major portion of the living population of tropical

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Indonesia originates from the north. Thus, all of the Mongolids and part of the Europids—for example, those from the island of Borneo—are apparently still not completely adapted to the tropical climate. Consequently, the often, strikingly gloomy emotional disposition of these people, together with their often weak constitution, and their unusual, psychological addiction to narcotics could be interrelated and result from the lack of biological adaptation to their tropical milieu.

The populations of the Philippine Islands are significantly healthier and stronger than the rest of the peoples of Southeast Asia. Perhaps this is in part due to the greater winter coolness of the region. On the other hand, this is evidently conditioned still more by the migration routes. According to the evidence of pre-history, the *Mongolids* of Borneo and the Philippine Islands have migrated to these regions from east and southeast China across Formosa. Therefore, these peoples from the beginning possessed no strains from the weak Veddids. The Mongolids of Sumatra and Java, in contrast, migrated from southern Indo-China across Malacca and Sumatra. This is also confirmed by prehistoric fossil finds. Consequently, these Mongolids were intermixed with Veddids from the beginning.

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

MAP 1

The language regions of Asia (Lundman, 1961).

U=Uralic; D=Dravidian; A=Andamanish;
K and Ket.=Ketoish; M=Austronesian (including the Mon group);
●=Burusaskish.



MAP 2

The racial regions of Asia (Lundman, 1961).

V=Veddid race; M=Malaid race; ●=Negritos.

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

FIGURE 1
Gobid racial type.



FIGURE 2
Kumid racial type.

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

FIGURE 3
North-Sinid racial type.



FIGURE 4
Palaungid racial type.

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

FIGURE 5
Dayakid racial type.



FIGURE 6
Malaid racial type.

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FIGURE 7
Veddid racial type (Ceylon)

FIGURE 8
Negrito racial type (Malacca).

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FIGURE 9
Malid racial type (India).



FIGURE 10
Indo-Melanid racial type (India).



FIGURE 11
Polynesid racial type.

FIGURE 12
South-Australid racial type.

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FIGURE 13
Cubiform racial type (Sumatra and Java).

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An Israeli Dilemma

by ROBERT G. LENSKI

Controversy continues to be lively regarding the right of the individual to determine how many children he or she will produce. At one extreme, the opponents of abortion and birth control maintain that God's "will" and the fetus's right to life take precedence over a desire to *maximize* one's progeny. Advocates of coercive population control, meanwhile, maintain that such social values as a decent environment and international stability take precedence over a desire to *maximize* one's progeny. These two orientations might be described as the right- and left-wing positions in the population debate, although the extent of their congruence with broader political and economic alignments remains largely conjecture.

Between these two radically divergent perspectives lies a third—the moderate view of the broad population "center." Population moderates in the United States, aided by the 1973 Supreme Court abortion ruling, have triumphed, and individual choice in reproductive decision-making is largely ascendant over the alternate values of fetal rights, social rights, or theological imperatives. That so many poor people in the United States continue to have more children than they want simply proves, of course, that individual prerogative has yet to be fully achieved. The inhibiting factor here, though it is seldom articulated, is a widespread reluctance to let government play an adequate rôle in providing birth control information and devices to those ignorant of or unable to afford them.

For most Americans, however, the Supreme Court ruling made a vital difference. The average citizen can freely implement his or her personal decision, whether it be to have two children, or five, or none—or to "leave it to God." In the past, the choice was usually between varying degrees of inconvenience and risk, and an unwanted child.

It is possible that this new era of individual supremacy in population decision-making will be followed by a temporary return to the recently scrapped dictates of God and fetus. In the long run, however, the future almost certainly belongs, here as elsewhere, to the "societalists"[1]—those who are disposed to recognize the social dimensions of problems in which others perceive only an individual or personal dimension.

[1] A word which, to my knowledge, has not been used before, but which fills a real need.

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Whenever the subject of coercive population control is broached, there is an almost universal tendency to regard it simply as a step that may be taken should voluntary controls fail to limit the *total* size of a population. It is true, of course, that some nations may be forced to use coercion for that reason. But coercive population measures are also a potential response in the event that voluntary controls fail to produce a desirable population *composition*. In other words, societalists may be as concerned with differing rates of fertility among the subgroups in a population as with fertility *per se*. Depending on the situation, they will perceive shifts in population composition (in modern societies, largely the product of differential fertility) to be of less, equal, or greater importance than change in the total population (the product of total fertility).

Modern Israel dramatically illustrates a situation in which differential fertility is potentially of far greater significance than fertility *per se*. To understand why, one needs at least a minimal acquaintance with the specific historical and social factors which resulted in the population dilemma confronting this celebrated little nation. Such recent population-crisis classics as Paul Ehrlich's *The Population Bomb* have concentrated almost exclusively on raw human numbers, a preoccupation which has seriously limited contemporary thinking on population. Careful consideration of the Israeli situation will help remedy that by allowing a more sophisticated assessment of the population problems of other nations and peoples. To that end, I will try to show how the Israeli dilemma is related to an entire category of population problems confronting the world. I will also make a prediction concerning a probable source of both popular and élite pressures for coercive population control in various parts of the world. Since none of this has much to do with the sheer numbers which furrow Ehrlich's brow, it makes sense to call it "the other population problem."

II

Israel is the only independent political entity controlled by Jews, one of the world's major ethno-religious groups. This is in sharp contrast with the situation of the other great Western religions, Islam and Christianity, both of whose members control large portions of the earth.

For 1878 years (70-1948) the Jews had no territorial base. Only under the most favorable circumstances (as in twentieth-century America) were they in a position in which their needs and desires as a group had to be seriously reckoned with by numerically dominant groups. Even in such favorable situations, they could never be certain that their security would continue,

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as it depended on complex and unpredictable social factors over which the group had little control.

The insecurities inherent in such a long period of homelessness had an inevitable impact on the group's psychology, while the specific restrictions to which Jews were widely subject helped determine their values and life style. Thus, even when the Western trend towards liberalism gradually (and sometimes abruptly) removed some of the restrictions to which Jews had been so long accustomed, there was, due to that fundamental human inertia often labelled conservatism, a perpetuation of traditional Jewish rôle-playing. Dependency on other groups was a basic reality of Jewish group existence for centuries, making their survival often appear dubious.

A second threat to Jewish survival, the ancient danger of assimilation, had traditionally occurred in precisely those times and places in which the first threat (to physical existence and psychic health) had been minimized. Most small minority groups throughout human history have followed one of two courses: either they became the majority or a large minority group (such as the early Christians), or they died out. The Jews are the most extensive and well-documented exception to this historic tendency: they have long roamed the earth, always in relatively small, if not minuscule, numbers, and yet they have retained their distinct identity. Out-group hostility has usually served to minimize casual contacts between them and their neighbors, thereby strengthening their solidarity. Then, since about the time of the French Revolution, this hostility has tended to diminish. The inevitable results have been not only increased intermarriage and conversion, but a marked weakening of Jewish religious and cultural values and traditions. The latter result has simply served as a feedback reinforcing the first. Thus begins a vicious circle from which group extrication can become impossible.

Interestingly enough, although the twin jeopardies of destruction and assimilation have tended to be mutually exclusive, the present century has brought both to a head for Jews. The explanation for this surprising conjunction is complex, involving the often simultaneous (or nearly so) upheavals of liberalism, nationalism, socialism, and industrialization/urbanization. But the consequences for world Jewry have been tragically simple. In the 1920s, up to 60 per cent of German Jews were marrying outside their group, while in the same time and place the forces behind the tremendous dislocations to come were building rapidly.

The fate of Jews after the Second World War under both Soviet atheism and Arab nationalism, combined with the precariousness of Western Jewish communities—which resulted precisely because of their members' *acceptance* by society—

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underlines again the near-synonymity of "modern" with "crisis" for Judaism. Since history proves that severe dislocations tend to exacerbate the dangers faced by small, dependent minorities, since modern world history has been characterized by dislocation on many different levels, and since there is no evidence that this situation is about to change, the message for world Jewry became clear: it must have a home place, a place it alone controls, a place to which any of its members may come if the need arises. Without such a home base, its future would be precarious at best. The twin threats of physical destruction and assimilation, often working simultaneously in different nations, would eventually destroy it.

Hitler has been called the step-father of Israel. Without the Holocaust there would likely be no Israel today. The historical record seems clear: despite Judaism's age-old emphasis on the necessity of returning to the Promised Land, the movement to Palestine under Zionist auspices was proceeding too slowly to beat the clock of growing Arab national aspirations. The Jews had to be "in safe" in the Mideast by the late 1940s. They barely made it. Without the extra nudge given Jewish emigration by Nazi terror; without the extra support given the legitimacy of the new Israeli state by European disgust with its record in treating the Jews, world Jewry would probably not have mobilized sufficiently to prevent a sudden *fait accompli* of Middle Eastern decolonization under exclusively Arab control.

Fortunately—although unfortunately—history allowed the creation of Israel in 1948. That event holds the possibility of Jewish survival and "normalization," not only in Israel, but in the Diaspora. If worse comes to worst, as it already has in the Arab lands, Jews of every nation have a homeland to which they can flee. During the Holocaust, nearly all doors were closed to them. The greatest barrier today is the "out-door" of emigration from the Soviet Union.

Part of Israel's universal benefit for Jews lies in the world's changed perception of them: as a people with a homeland, they are now seldom regarded, as they so often were in the past, with awe and suspicion (as "supernaturals") or with distaste (as social parasites). Jewish self-identity has undergone a similar change, and Kurt Lewin, Filton Steinberg, and other students of the phenomenon of Jewish self-hatred have considered the Jewish state indispensable to its cure. More, Jews in every land now have a sovereign defender who can make their domestic mistreatment an international issue. Finally, and of tremendous consequence, Judaism at last has a religious and cultural center, something which may well be essential to any group's survival in the kinetic world of the future.

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Israel, then, *means* survival for Judaism. For it allows a concentration of Jews within a single sovereign geographic entity where they can compose a majority of the population and thus be masters of their destiny. But this requires more than a simple majority. Because the Israeli deal includes universal suffrage—one person, one vote—it is possible to envision an Israel with Jews and Arabs so close numerically that the former would have but precarious control. And Jewish opinion is rarely monolithic, suggesting the possibility of ruling coalitions diametrically opposed to the best interests of the Jewish majority. For these reasons, and because Arab political inequality would be an unthinkable solution, a *substantial* Jewish majority within Israel is absolutely essential.

There are other reasons why the welfare of world Jewry requires a large Jewish majority within Israel. The most important of these is tied to the certainty that the present social differentiation between Jews and Arabs will remain for the foreseeable future. Every effort of the Israeli government to raise Arab living standards will long be inadequate to undo the differences wrought by hundreds of years. For example, Arabs are, and will undoubtedly remain for some time, overrepresented in manual occupations. With Arabs comprising only some 10 per cent of the national population, many Jews are laboring along with them. But consider what would happen if the Arab population grew to 40 per cent of the total. Israeli Jews would come to resemble a national élite more than an all-pervasive national group. Many Jews in Israel are currently working below their skill capacities, often by choice. But with large numbers of Arabs competing for unskilled jobs, Jewish insistence upon holding too many of them could result in great Arab unemployment and a depressed economy. On the other hand, a mass Jewish exodus from these jobs would result in an ethnically stratified society, leaving Jews vulnerable to a revival of the very charges of parasitism which necessitated Zionism.

As Jews thus became more a national élite and less a pervasive element in their society, there would be other consequences. The Zionist struggle to redeem the benefits of physical labor and of close association with the land and with nature would be jeopardized, and a measure of their economic, psychological, and cultural independence would be lost.

This line of reasoning recalls the basic belief which motivated Zionism: that a truly Jewish state, one with a large Jewish majority, is essential if the Jew, as a Jew, is to survive. At the beginning of the century, this was the private belief of a radically pessimistic minority. Today, it is the unhappy wisdom of nearly all Jews.

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III

Perhaps the best testimony to the magnitude of the military and diplomatic threats facing Israel is the extent to which another great challenge has been swept beneath the rug of national consciousness. This neglected challenge is the tremendous discrepancy between Jewish and Arab rates of natural increase (the surplus of live births over deaths) which favors the latter. A recent manual of the Israeli Information Services, which contains many hundreds of bibliographical entries between 1967 and 1973, illustrates the point: only a single item taken from the Israel-oriented press during those years is devoted primarily to the Arab-Jewish population conflict. Most book-length treatments of Israel also neglect the subject.

Even so, Golda Meir at least once commented publicly that she does not wish to wake up every morning and count the number of Arab and Jewish births.[2] Nor is she alone in her awareness of the situation. Readers of the Arab press are apt to encounter a subdued gloating over the lopsided reproduction statistics. Yet, despite these responses, the salient facts are still not widely circulated, nor has there been even a minimal interpretation of these facts for the lay reader. What follows is an effort to rectify this situation.

The study of population centers on the three major demographic processes: fertility, mortality, and migration. Change within and between populations is always attributable to one, or a combination, of these factors. Israel's claim to fame in the population field has, of course, been the extent to which international migration, operating under the Law of Jewish Return, has shaped her early history. Nearly every social study of this "nation of immigrants" has focused on migration-related themes, the periodic shifts in the geographical origins of immigrants, for example, and the changing problems in adjustment to Israeli life accompanying these shifts. Though the rise of the second generation of native-born Israelis is rapidly altering all this, migration will be remembered as the great story of the first quarter-century of Israeli history.

In view of this, certain Israeli population data are striking, even startling. Since the early, unstable days of Israeli independence—days marked by massive Arab flight and massive Jewish immigration—the proportion of Arabs in the population has not diminished. The non-Jewish element of the population[3] was

[2] The late David Ben-Gurion was another leader who indicated his concern for the situation.

[3] The minority population consists of Moslems (Arab), 75 per cent; Christians (largely Arab), 17 per cent; Druze and others, 8 per cent.

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12.20 per cent in 1950; in 1971 it stood at 14.80 per cent.[4] How could this have happened in the face of an incoming Jewish tide?

Vital statistics provide the answer to that question. In 1969, a year typical of the Israeli experience in all aspects, the nation's *live birth rate* was 26.2 per 1000 people. For Jews it was 23.4; for all non-Jews it was 46.4; for Moslem Arabs it was 50.9. In only two geographical districts was the non-Jewish rate less than 44.7: in highly urban Jerusalem (32.8) and Tel Aviv (33.3). By contrast, the highest Jewish rate, found in the heavily rural, frontier-like Southern district, was only 30.3. At the same time, *death rates* were quite similar: 7.2 per 1000 for Jews, 5.9 per 1000 for all non-Jews. By definition, rates of *natural increase* (live birth rate minus death rate) were highly dissimilar. Thus, in 1969, when the Jewish rate of natural increase was only 16.2 per 1000, the total non-Jewish rate stood at 40.5, the Moslem Arabs' at 45.0. To put these figures in their proper perspective, it is worth noting that of 145 countries listed in U.N. population data for this time period, only one had a rate of natural increase exceeding 34: Costa Rica with 38. This, then, is what the Israeli majority is up against: a minority group which, at its present rate, will double every 17 years.

Other figures further dramatize the picture. In 1969, the *average age* of Jews in Israel was 30.0; for Moslems it was 19.9. At the same time, the *median ages* were 24.6 and 13.9 respectively. In 1971, 52.8 per cent of Israeli Moslems were under age 15; for Jews the figure was 30.1 per cent. For ages 45-64, the percentages were 7.3 per cent (Moslem) and 19.4 per cent (Jewish). In other words, the ratio between these two age groups is about 3:2 for Jews and about 7:1 for Moslem Arabs. It is important to note that this discrepancy does not obtain from any form of age selection occurring at the time of the Arab displacement from Palestine. Among those Arabs who remained, there was a rough approximation of the general Palestinian age structure. Similarly, the distortion caused by age selection among Jews migrating to Israel is minimal.

As useful as these population measures may be, they are still less revealing than the one demographers refer to as the *gross reproduction rate* (G.R.R.). The G.R.R. analyzes annual birth data by the age of women giving birth—that is, it employs age-specific birth rates. Using the data from a given year, the G.R.R.

[4] The latter figure includes the Arab population of East Jerusalem, officially annexed by Israel following the June 1967 war, but not the million or more Arabs inhabiting the other lands which fell under Israeli administration in the wake of that conflict. Even without the annexation of East Jerusalem, the non-Jewish figure would have been approximately 13 per cent.

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calculates the number of *girl babies* (potential future mothers) which can be expected to be born to each 1000 women in the course of their childbearing years if: (1) the age-specific birth rates of that particular year remain constant, and (2) no women in the group die before reaching menopause.[5] To the extent that a population's age-specific birth rate, and hence its G.R.R. remains stable over a number of years, the limitations inherent in relying upon *annual* data are minimized. Therefore, the fact that in 1958 the G.R.R. for Moslem Arabs in Israel first rose above 4000 (four daughters projected for every woman attaining childbearing age) and has never since fallen below that figure, provides a revealing indicator of their fertility. Incidentally, in 1964 and 1965, the G.R.R. for this group attained a peak of 4780, while the Jewish G.R.R.s were only 1660 and 1680.

Many observers had hoped that the high fertility of Israel's Oriental Jews (those tracing their ancestry to Asia and North Africa) would offset the discrepancy between Jewish and Arab reproduction rates. Oriental Jewry's G.R.R., however, has never topped the 3060 figure it attained in 1951, but has instead plummeted to the neighbourhood of 2000. The G.R.R. of Occidental Jews (those tracing their ancestry to Europe and America) has for two decades remained in the range of 1100-1300, typical for a Western population. Actually, the fertility differential which distinguishes the two branches of Israeli Jewry should not be viewed as a solution, but rather as a social problem in itself, albeit one which is gradually diminishing, in marked contrast to the yawning interfaith differential.

IV

The story of the Jewish-Arab population conflict may best be summarized as a stand-off resulting from the high immigration rate of the one and the high fertility of the other. The crucial question now, of course, concerns the future of this uneasy balance of such long standing. (Indeed, the Arab edge in natural increase has been well-documented since the first days of the British Mandate in Palestine.)

In assessing that future, we have to consider first, the demography of developing peoples in general, and second, the particular experiences of those peoples with the closest cultural resemblance to Israeli Arabs. Also pertinent, but, at least until

[5] Another measure used by demographers is the *net reproduction rate* (N.R.R.), which resembles the G.R.R. but adds the refinement of taking into account female death rates prior to menopause. These death rates are sufficiently small among all Israeli population groups, however, as to render this of minimal importance.

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very recently, harder to determine, are the prospects for future Jewish immigration to Israel. Israeli officials recognize that the nation's future depends heavily upon exogenous factors over which it exercises little or no control. In the case of migration, the great decisions will be made not in Jerusalem, but in Moscow.

As we said before, the Jewish experience in Israel, with the sole exception of certain newly-transplanted Oriental communities, has consistently resembled that of other modern populations, with both birth and death rates low. Israeli Arabs, by contrast, began with the high birth and death rates typical of underdeveloped peoples and subsequently experienced a steady, rapid drop in the latter without any shift in the former. The result has been that "population explosion" which is nearly universal among post-Second World War developing nations.

Population experts explain this phenomenon by referring to *demographic transition,* which posits the inevitability of a time lag between lowering the death rate and lowering the birth rate during the course of a people's modernization. Deaths are decidedly the easier of the two to affect: minimal improvements in hygiene and medicine can produce dramatic declines in deaths, seemingly overnight. The difficulty comes in trying to reduce births, for short of coercive government action, this comes about only through change in the motivations, values, and life situations of large numbers of individuals. Forces *outside* a society or social group can play a large rôle in effecting change in death rates: even the backward masses of India live longer because of such imports as smallpox vaccine. But the story is different for birth rates, where change can occur only among a population minimally sophisticated on the subject of birth control, and *motivated* to limit their offspring.

It is in this area of motivation that population experts are still rather ignorant. Why is one group of people suddenly eager to reduce drastically the size of its families, while another group, in an apparently similar social milieu, continues in its old fertility patterns? The answers to such questions are complex. And if this aspect of human behavior is poorly understood by the experts, small wonder that the policy-makers of the world are floundering.

Nevertheless, a number of motivations in the area of human fertility have been noted. Prominent on the list are an individual's personal ambitions and their compatibility with family life, and individual evaluation of the relative importance of personal, family, and group welfare. Beyond these considerations lies something even more basic: awareness of a decline in the group's death rate. A decline in fertility will not occur in the absence of a decline in mortality, except, of course, under conditions of

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exceptional stress, as in Second World War death camps. This prerequisite for lower fertility has, of course, long been a fact for both Jews and Arabs in Israel, as indicated in the statistics above.

There are now two basic possibilities for Israeli Arab fertility. The first, and the one Jews hope for, is that, following the time lag inherent in "demographic transition," the Arab mortality decline will be accompanied by a fertility decline of similar magnitude. In real terms, this means that typical Arab parents, having learned that they no longer need produce eight children to have two or three reach maturity, and indeed, that rearing eight children to maturity is a real handicap for them, the children, and society, will undertake to bring their fertility into line. According to the "trial and error" theory of demographic transition, the unhappy conditions generated by one or two generations of excessive reproduction will create the pressures necessary for such an adjustment.

It is the second possibility which Jews fear: that Arabs will make no strides in aligning their fertility and mortality. This could happen, in part at least, as a result of the fact that most Israeli Arabs are still, to varying degrees, unreconciled to the existence of the Jewish state and recognize that their political leverage within that state will increase as their numerical strength increases, even if they never actualley attain a majority. That Arab opposition to Israel might be the decisive factor in its future fertility is consistent with demographer Frank Lorimer's contention that the social history of a religious or ethnic group can have major implications for its position on social issues, particularly its readiness to adopt birth control.

Yet even if there is no significant link between Arab resentment and fertility, it does not follow that there will be a sharp decline in Arab fertility. For no sizeable Arab or Moslem population anywhere has yet experienced such a decline. It may be that formidable cultural barriers, not yet clearly identified, preclude such a development for Israeli Arabs. Unfortunately, there is little evidence with which to assess this possibility: published information on fertility differentials within Middle Eastern countries, and on the efforts of segments of their populations to control fertility, are limited. Several students of the problem have, however, demonstrated a slight fertility decline among Egyptian élites, with extent of the wife's education found to be the most important contributing factor. Janet Abu-Lughod has shown that in Cairo this was happening at least as early as the 1920s, but the proportion of the Egyptian population in that category is so small that the overall fertility rate of the nation has not been affected.

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A particularly valuable source for interpreting Arab demography is David Yaukey's study of Lebanon.[6] In a field survey involving 900 married women, Yauyek obtained data on their social background (religion, education, husband's occupation, size of community, and number of rooms per family member), and correlated it with their fertility histories, attitudes towards fertility, and "immediate determinants of fertility." The latter included "factors affecting exposure to intercourse" (such as, age at marriage, frequency of intercourse); "factors affecting exposure to conception" (such as, periods of lactation, use of contraceptives); and "factors affecting gestation and successful parturition" (such as, spontaneous and induced abortions). The survey is unique, the only one of its type made among an Arab Mideastern population which had undergone substantial modernization.

The great majority of the women Yaukey studied fell within six major groupings [see table]. Both village groups had very high fertility. The mere fact of urbanization, unaccompanied by education, was sufficient to reduce the fertility of Christian Lebanese by half.

	Social group		*Number*	*Fertility rate*
Village	Christian	Uneducated	76	8.16
Village	Moslem	Uneducated	184	7.43
City[1]	Christian	Uneducated	96	4.14
City	Moslem	Uneducated	136	7.35
City	Christian	Educated	107	3.44
City	Moslem	Educated	49	5.56

[1] All city residents surveyed lived in Beirut. There were very few educated village residents.

Yet both modernizing influences, education and urbanization combined, did not have nearly that much impact on Moslem fertility, while urbanization alone had none whatever. Yaukey cites comparative data from Egypt, indicating that its Copt (Christian) minority, too, is much quicker to undergo fertility decline than is the Moslem majority. The remarkably high fertility of Moslem Albania, located in a sea of European Christians with low birth rates, is yet another apparent indication of the resistance of Islamic culture to fertility decline, even in the presence of some degree of modernization.

Yaukey suggests several reasons for this. First, the Islamic themes of numerical expansion and fatalism, by definition,

[6] David Yaukey, *Fertility Differences in a Modernizing Country*, Princeton University Press, 1961.

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work against the adoption of birth control. Second, the traditional Moslem family system encourages high fertility: marriage is almost universal; girls marry very early; and families are judged by the number of sons they produce. Finally, Moslems are less likely to alter their social behaviour to conform to the models of more advanced, largely Western and Christian peoples than are groups whose indigenous cultures do not offer such a strong counter-model. This tendency is intensified when the Western model is associated with the Israeli presence, as is certainly the case for Israel's Arabs.

Since three-fourths of Israel's non-Jews are Moslem, the implications are obvious. *Israel's Jews may well be confronted with a case of serious resistance to fertility decline, like those demographers have documented in other economically advanced parts of the world.* The roots of resistance in this particular instance may lie in the general cultural norms of the Moslem world, in the specific historical grievances of the Palestinians, or, most likely, both. In any case, despite the fact that approximately 95 per cent of Israeli Arab men and 75 per cent of their women now receive primary education, there is no indication of a fertility decline among Moslem Arabs, and very little among the Christian Arabs.

V

Meanwhile, Israeli officials continue to stake their hopes on Jewish fertility and immigration. In 1972, the treasurer of the Jewish Agency was anticipating the arrival of " at least a million Jews " during the next decade. Such an expectation could have rested only on a most unrealistic projection of Soviet Jewish emigration, since there are no other potential sources for large numbers of Jewish immigrants.

An effort, led by Senator Henry M. Jackson (Democrat-Washington), to tie Congressional passage of a trade bill, granting " most-favored-nation " status to the Soviet Union, to Soviet easing of emigration restrictions, particularly for Jews, has achieved dubious results to date. The negotiations have been remarkable in their delicacy, complexity, and secrecy, even by the standards of superpower negotiations. This is understandable when one considers that here is an issue which the Soviet government has traditionally regarded as *internal policy.* There is obviously a deep fear of setting a precedent which may present complex problems later, since the Soviet state is founded upon a vast assortment of nationalities.

Two sets of Israeli demographic projections, only recently

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regarded by many as pessimistic, in assuming Jewish net immigra-rates of 15 and 25 thousand per year over the next decade or two, may yet be recognized as optimistic. Based on 15,000 Jewish immigrants per year, the non-Jewish population in Israel would reach 16.7 per cent by 1985; at 25,000 per year, it would attain 15.9 per cent. In the former case, the ratio of Jews to non-Jews would become a little less than 5: 1; in the latter, it would remain slightly larger. The ratios in the crucial younger age groups would be considerably different, of course, in both cases in the range of *4:1.* Compare this to the situation only 20 years ago, when the ratio for the total population was 8: 1.

Furthermore, these projections did not anticipate the Jewish decline sudenly ending at, say 4: 1. The likelihood, rather, was that the Israeli ethnic shift would drop further, to ratios of 3: 1 and even 2: 1—and this within the lifetimes of many already born. Even the spectre of an Arab majority lay on, not beyond, the horizon of the newly born Israeli baby. And as we said before, it would not take an actual Arab majority to wreck the Israeli dream. Without a favorable arrangement on Soviet emigration, Israel was starting down the road which leads to such tragedies as Cyprus, Mississippi, and Northern Ireland. Even with good favor, the fundamental Israeli population dilemma may not be solved, only postponed.

Israeli officials may finally have to wake up to the fact that a population whose growth depends heavily on a steady rate of immigration cannot, in the long run, hold its own against a population which is growing by virtue of a high rate of natural increase. The margin enjoyed by the former is tied directly to its initial numerical superiority and its subsequent level of immigration. In the case of Israel's Jews, this margin of safety is obviously susceptible to progressive erosion. A large Soviet emigration, unaccompanied by a shift in Arab fertility, would alter only the timetable of the erosion, not the fact itself.

A high degree of pluralism does not invariably lead to social disaster, of course. The Netherlands, with its happily coexistent Catholic and Calvinist communiites, proves this. Unfortunately, such examples often involve a significant degree of *regional* separation, as in Switzerland, with its German, French, and Italian sectors. This separation has been absent in Cyprus, Mississippi and Ulster—and in Israel, where separation is on a fairly local scale. The absence of a protective regionalism and the unfavorable historical context are two serious debits for Israeli pluralism. On the other hand, the magnitude of the ratio of Jews to non-Jews has been its most favorable element. Hence every erosion of that ratio is fraught with significance. The psychological distances between 8: 1 and 4: 1 and 2: 1 are vast.

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The strife in Northern Ireland, a land which has experienced a similar contraction, may be more directly the result of a century of excessive Catholic fertility than of historic Catholic grievances. And this fertility almost surely reflects Catholic cultural norms, rather than anything done by the Protestants. There may be a lesson here for Israel.

The official response to the Israeli population dilemma, beyond an almost perfunctory encouragement of immigration, has been an implicit endorsement of what might be called "selective pro-natality," or a selective encouragement of births. Such a policy is unpromising for several reasons. First, and most important, the track record of government policies pushing higher fertility has been abysmal. (There is some evidence of minimal success by the Russian and German dictatorships during the 1930s, and in Rumania more recently, but these are exceptions.) Second, *selective* pro-natality (that is, a program aimed at only a part of the population) is obviously difficult for a government to implement. Finally, what is ineffective when done explicitly, is virtually meaningless when implicit.

The government's first wrong step was to establish in 1949 a cash grant scheme to reward very large families. This was phased out as it became obvious that Arab families were getting nearly all the benefits. Over the years, a variety of proposals to encourage legally Jewish births were advanced, and plans that could be implemented through private Jewish organizations, or along the lines of geographical subdivisions, were in turn considered and discarded as unworkable. Finally, the Israeli military was recognized as the logical vehicle for such an effort. Israel has always been proud of the fact that her minorities enjoy all the rights of her citizenship while being excluded only from the *duty* of military service. Then, with the passage of the Discharged Soldiers Law, 5730-1970, this claim became problematic: its financial provisions for discharged soldiers and their families potentially benefit up to 99 per cent of the Jewish population, but none of the Moslem. These provisions were designed primarily for the selective encouragement of Jewish fertility.

The quandary was in small part resolved—but not without a price. Calling the law "infamous, shameful and scandalous," Knesset Member Uri Avnery said: "The intention is to encourage births among one part of the population of Israel and to effect the opposite among the other part . . . the distinction . . . being an ethnic one . . . I warn the Knesset of one thing only: we shall hear of this law for many years to come from public tribunals, just as we hear about certain laws in certain other countries."

If Avnery's position seems unfair, given the present

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imbalance in Israeli demography, still it is difficult to counter it with standard ethical reasoning. And this, if nothing else, is a good indication that the Israelis, and, indeed, all peoples, need to develop an explicit *population ethics.* At present, there seems to be scant awareness of this need, but perhaps a little story will make it immediately apparent.

The population of country X consists of two ethnic subgroups, group J, comprising 85 per cent of the total, and group A, 15 per cent. These groups disagree on virtually everything. This is unfortunate but, unless one advocates some form of élitism (as in South Africa), one must agree that J's views should dominate, consonant with the basic rights of A. This solution is obviously democratic and the lesser of two evils.

One day, country X is confronted with an issue we will call " ! "—an issue to which there are only two possible responses. Should the nation choose response No. 1, the issue will be resolved and the *status quo* between A and J maintained. On the other hand, should the nation choose No. 2, the values and wishes of A (with which J vehemently disagrees) will be assured of permanent ascendancy in the not-distant future. In other words, if J yields on the single issue " ! ," it is, for all practical purposes, yielding its entire future. Could any reasonable person fault J for resolving " ! " in its own favor?

Consider, too, that J is presently very unhappy due to its awareness of the implications of " ! " for its future. Is it unreasonable to suggest that J (the majority) be assured, by its government, that " ! " will be answered with No. 1?

Country X is, of course, Israel, " ! " is the subject of this article, and the model is anything but hypothetical. Justice does, indeed, demand that the Israeli majority be given clear assurance that they and their values have a future in their homeland.

Consider, with this problem in mind, the possibility of using legislation to *guarantee* the maintenance of at least a three-quarters Jewish majority in Israel. Laws could be formulated to accomplish this through reasonable means, without recourse, it goes without saying, to such measures as forced Arab exile or interference with religious freedom. Could such laws be called discriminatory when the group formulating the proposal would be agreeing to a potentially large initial slippage in its own proportion of the population? Like the ethical dilemma they might conceivably help, some day, to solve, ideas like these have not yet seen the full light of day. But serious consideration of them will probably soon become unavoidable—and not only in Israel.

One thing is certain: it is not yet time for any such " 75 per cent Jewish Law." Israeli Jews have not even demonstrated

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sufficient concern for their problem to try to solve it by more conventional means. For example, careful K.A.P. (knowledge, attitude, practice) studies of Arab reproductive behavior, like those already made on Israeli Jews, have yet to be made. The facts behind Arab behavior need to be widely disseminated and clearly understood. One day, the Israeli government may follow the recommendations of those who propose making Arabs eligible for non-combat conscription, since conscription is believed to have aided Oriental Jews considerably in absorbing Israeli social norms, including smaller families. Soon there must be an all-out effort to upgrade as much as possible the education of Arab women, since demography offers few inverse correlations stronger that that between female education and fertility. Soon a variety of conventional remedies for excess fertility will be tried. Collectively, these efforts may meet with success.

But should they prove insufficient, should the Israeli Arabs' "will to power" be too strong to be countered by a progress fostering voluntary reproductive control, there would be only one alternative: *involuntarism*.

What measures might be included in such legislative action as would then ensue? The technology required for oft-cited devices like chemicals in the water supply is, we are told, still far from perfected. Mandatory abortion would be out of the question in cases where the operation is equated with murder—although this view is not widely held among Moslems. The likeliest means for implementing an involuntary population policy, in Israel or elsewhere, would be mandatory sterilization following the birth of a certain number of children. This could be defended ethically if it were legally defined and impartilaly administered. Reversible sterilization, hopefully near perfection, would provide insurance against such events as the death of a child or remarriage. But most important, a sterilization policy would have to be applied strictly and openly, and without regard to ethnicity, wealth, or any possible conception of merit. Monitoring of the policy might be done by some arm of the world community, with violators severely punished. Fuller treatments are available elsewhere on the safeguards to be built into such a system.[7]

We may be certain that the air would reverberate with cries of "genocide" should a "75 per cent Jewish Law" ever come to pass in Israel. Indeed, religious elements within Israel's *Jewish* population would probably be in the forefront of the opposition. Since religious parties frequently hold the balance of

[7] Exceptions might, of course, continue to be made for the mentally deranged, hopeless retarded, and so on.

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power in the Knesset, such opposition would not be unimportant. Even so, the bulk of the protest would certainly derive from Arab and Moslem sources. But time may make it imperative for Israel to extend its code of ethics to deal with the problems of population composition. Any claim that a law designed to maintain Israel's Jewishness is *ipso facto* "genocide" is easily countered by the argument that the only alternative is a kind of "laissez-faire genocide." Of course, such wild abandon in the use of the word "genocide" causes it to lose much of the strength of its meaning. With this word, that should not be permitted to happen.

Whether Israel presents such a case or not, instances will probably arise in which a majority has the right to assure itself perpetual majority status. Ours is an age which seeks to eliminate warfare and civil strife, and ours is a world whose political boundaries are increasingly "fixed." It is also an increasingly democratic world, where numbers equal power and population change equals change in the *distribution* of power. It is this change which stimulates fear and conflict. Surely, in their efforts to find viable solutions to the dilemmas posed by differential fertility, the leaders of such a world will utilize new technologies.

This extension of the familiar principle of "majority rights" can easily be carried too far, of course. Certainly it would be a poor solution to have a world consisting of political units in which the major ethnic and other subgroups of a national population were of rigid, predetermined sizes. But potential for abuse (which is, after all, inherent in everything man touches) is not a satisfactory reason for refusing to try something at all. There may come a time and a place where a program of mandatory sterilization, equitably administered, will be just, and its rejection patently unjust.

VI

It will be interesting if the first instance of government coercion in population control occurs as a result of a crisis of population composition rather than one of total population size. There are two reasons why this may happen. First, as suggested, population composition affects the relative power of groups within a pluralistic society; population size does not. Second, those nations most concerned with population size (e.g., India, Bangladesh) generally lack the ability to implement, on a nationwide scale, coercive legislation. But even if they had that capability, it is questionable whether their leaders would have the will to use it. After all, leaders are not starving anywhere in

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the world, nor does mass starvation threaten the survival of the ethnic and/or religious groups with which any of them identify.

By contrast, Israel's Jewish leaders, if they yield to the power of Arab fertility, could face serious threats, both to their own personal power and to the world-wide future of their beloved group. No one who comprehends the solidarity of contemporary Jews regarding Israel will suppose that Jewish sacrifices on the battlefront were made so that the Arabs might triumph, simply and finally, in the bedroom. Jews, after many centuries of hard experience, have finally thrown off the curse of universal minority status. Now they must avoid the danger inherent in anything less than *complete* sovereignty over some portion of the earth. Israeli leadership will never accept an Arab majority, or even a large Arab minority. They will act decisively, if necessary, to protect themselves and their people.

Individual reaction to Israeli government intervention in the area of human reproduction would generally reflect one's opinion of Israeli legitimacy per se. Many of those who admit that injustices were committed against individual Palestinians in order that Israel might live, can, while regretting them, still call Israel's creation just. For they know that far greater injustice would have resulted had much of Jewry been left homeless, and all of Jewry been left with little hope of ultimate survival.

The creation of Israel effected a temporary trade-off in refugees, creating Palestinian ones, absorbing Jewish ones. But it allowed the continued viability of a major cultural-religious group, without extinguishing anything comparable. The hardships of Palestinian Arabs have not seriously affected the fates of Arabs or Moslems elsewhere in the world. Failure to create Israel, on the other hand, would probably have meant the eventual disappearance of Judaism from the earth. Even if world Jewry's immediate physical and economic survival had not been in the balance, its psychological and spiritual survival were. Had the gradual assimilation by the Jewish consciousness of the immensity of the Holocaust been unaccompanied by the leavening of the Israel experience, Judaism would almost surely have been left a meaningless tradition, its faith shattered and nearly impossible to regain. Had Israel not been created, there would today be nothing on the horizon to make Jewish identity worth retaining in a time when the cruel after-shocks of Auschwitz continue.

No one who has seen and sanctioned the injustice already done to the Palestinians in the name of Israel would be inclined to risk Israel to spare them, perhaps, a little more. Either one believes in the basic right of the Jewish people to control their own destiny, or one does not. Obviously, there are limits to the

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exercise of Jewish destiny: Israel must not go on an imperialistic rampage. But surely equitable population control is well within acceptable limits for almost anyone who has personally sanctioned the original Zionist initiative.

I have suggested, throughout this article, that the Israeli dilemma over its differential fertility is not unique. Global trends strongly suggest that a number of other nations may be on a collision course which will make coercive population controls obligatory.

One such trend is found primarily in non-Communist nations, particularly the more democratic ones, and involves the gradual surfacing of long-submerged ethnic and regional divisions. Thus Canada has its Quebec problem; Britain, still wrestling with its Irish dilemma; and the ancient division of Fleming and Walloon threatens to rupture Belgium. Yugoslavia is the major exception to a general absence of this trend in Communist nations. Like the Soviet Union's, its polity is built upon an amalgam of nationalities, and, as the liberal of the Communist world, it has been rocked by the fractious demands of its Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Slovenes, Macedonians and Montenegrins.

A strong argument against the prospect of liberalization in the U.S.S.R. can, in fact, be made on the basis of that nation's extreme ethnic heterogeneity. Its ethnically Russian leadership is undoubtedly acutely aware of the contemporary relationship between central liberalism and ethnic assertiveness, and realizes that liberalization beyond an unknown critical point could lead to a rapid disintegration of the Soviet state. There is a parallel here with the South African situation: ethnic heterogenity, beyond a certain threshold, may lead to a perceived need for conservatism. It may be because their general commitment to other freedoms allows them little leeway.

A second and more ominous tendency is toward a dichotomy between *socio-economic power* and *demographic power* among the world's peoples. Put simply, this means that socially and economically powerless peoples almost everywhere are reproducing more rapidly than the powerful, and, in the process, are frequently attaining another type of "power." The resulting power schism has developed in many nations and on many levels. It can be observed both *inter*nationally and *intra*nationally, and gives every indication of growing worse before it gets better.

In its most celebrated form, this schism separates the reproductively stable developed world from the Third World of exploding populations. But its occurrence *within* nations may be the greater threat to peace. In the United States, the relative political, social and economic power of various ethnic groups is in almost direct inverse proportion to their fertility levels. In

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the Soviet Union, the relatively powerless Asian nationalities have birth rates up to three times greater than those of their European counterparts. The major reason such situations have not already resulted in major conflicts is the simple but disconcerting one that the process has been operating for such a short time. The genesis of the problem is clearly related to the rise of the welfare state, in both its capitalist and socialist forms.

Historically, the demographic power of a human population was usually tied to its power in other facets of life. Now, the growth of welfarism has terminated this ancient relationship. The common assumption, to date, has been that welfarism would automatically lead to a new demographic equilibrium between those extending and those receiving welfare. Certainly, this will sometimes happen, and prospects are more encouraging for the United States than for many nations in this regard. Nonetheless, there is considerable evidence both that the re-establishment of demographic balance is not inevitable, and that, even when it does occur, the time lag involved seriously threatens the power of many of the world's power-holding ethnic groups. In either case, the élite groups will be seriously tempted to "complete" the welfare state by extending its economic coercion to the reproductive realm. And it is not patently obvious that such an extension would invariably be unjust. Each case must be decided on its own merits.

I have chosen Israel to illustrate what is, in fact, a worldwide dilemma, because, as *the* Jewish state, it offers one of the most clear-cut moral cases for legislating demographic change in a society. Until recently it also provided one of the most critical instances of the need for such an innovation. In its exponential curve of growth, the Israeli Arab population had just reached the runaway point. Now, however, the anticipated input of Soviet Jews has apparently removed the imminent danger and granted a reprieve to voluntarism in Arab reproduction.

Israel's neighbor, Lebanon, meanwhile, provides a final and sobering reminder of the potential for unhappiness in what I have referred to as "An Israeli Dilemma." Once highly regarded as an island of stability in an Arab sea, Lebanon now appears to be rapidly sliding toward civil war, if not outright anarchy. Although Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have exacerbated the problem, most Lebanese are quick to concede that the underlying difficulty is in the Arab nation's Christian-Moslem division. The Christian bloc was traditionally slightly the larger, and its control of the government was actually written into the Constitution. Today, however, the Moslems, who already comprise a bare majority of the Lebanese people and whose numerical dominance is growing, have begun to demand control. Even if

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the Christians refuse to yield, their legitimacy will be gravely undermined. Either way, a return to the stability of the past seems impossible.

The political impact of differential fertility can be decisive. For Lebanese Christians, the hour for action has passed. Although Lebanon is not the only Christian country in the world, it *is* the only country of Maronites, a distinctive Christian group whose origins lie in the seventh century. Her Christian leaders are keenly aware of this and have definite ideas about what their country should be.[8]

Looking at the future, I suspect that many ethnic groups now in positions of dominance will not insist upon a moral basis as compelling as Israel's before they move to defend their demographic power base. On the contrary, when the threat to their basic political interests becomes obvious, the adoption of coercive birth control policies aimed at preserving the demographic status quo is likely to be seen by the dominant groups as both possible and desirable.

POSTSCRIPT

On 30th March 1976, the Indian state of Maharashtra (population, 55 million) became the world's first to introduce a compulsory sterilization law. By a vote of 75 to 1, the state assembly approved legislation mandating a six months' jail term and a $57 fine for couples with three or more children where the husband is under 55 years of age and the wife under 45. Under the bill, husbands must have vasectomies or wives tubeotomies to end their childbearing capacity. The signature of the president of India, in New Delhi, is considered certain.

The Indian government have announced that schools, housing, medical care, government jobs and drinking water would be denied to government employees and Delhi residents who would not limit their families to two children. But no criminal penalties were proposed for those failing to comply. The Punjab state cabinet approved a plan calling for up to three years in jail and a fine for couples bearing a fourth child, but forced sterilization was not mentioned. Most of India's 22 states, as well as the federal government, are now considering legislation along similar lines.

The author has not followed Indian affairs closely enough to know whether this unexpected national drive towards coercive population control is related to a movement in 1975 away from

[8] These remarks concerning Lebanon were written, incidentally, in November 1973.

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Western-style civil liberties. Perhaps certain Indians in high places were exceedingly concerned about ending the nation's population explosion. In any case, the central prediction of this article—that ethnicity would motivate the world's first coercive sterilization legislation applicable to all citizens— now *seems* to have been proved wrong. It is interesting to note, however, that the lone dissenter to the Maharastra bill's introduction was a Moslem League member—that is, a member of India's largest religious minority. It is perhaps too early to discount ethnic motives in the Indian case.

Meanwhile, the same page of the newspaper which recounts the new Indian law also tells of the most violent *internal* clashes in the entire 28-year history of Israel, with five Arabs killed. Israel's socio-demographic crisis continues to escalate.

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Pelvic Brim and Cranial Size

By NATHANIEL WEYL

Dr J. Lawrence Angel of the Smithsonian Institution, whose pioneer discoveries in paleoanthropolgy and paleoprehistory are only now beginning to receive the academic recognition they deserve, published a paper in 1975 which attempts to plot the course of various significant indices of human material well-being from approximately B.C. 30,000 to the present.[1] From the skeletal evidence at his disposal, Angel has attempted to infer such salient population characteristics as lifespan, fertility, mortality for various age cohorts, dental condition and incidence of malaria. In this paper, we shall be concerned merely with Angel's evidence concerning the depth of the pelvic inlet and its possible significance in terms of the temporal and spatial distribution of cranial size.

"Since the pelvis transmits body weight to the femur heads by a curved arch (sacrum and ilia) whose tendency is to spread apart under pressure only the anterior arch of the pubic bone resists," Dr Angel writes, "pelvic depth is the diameter, reduced if pelvic bone growth is hindered by poor nutrition in childhood and this in turn can decrease the effective size of the birth canal; extra large foetuses will be more likely to die from birth trauma and also to endanger their mothers if this A-P diameter drops below 10 cm."[2]

As evidence of the sensitivity of the pelvic inlet to nutrition, Angel cites findings that there was a lowering of the index by about 4 units for people who were young children in England during the food shortage years of the First World War (1915-1918)[3] and also data on class differences in size of pelvic brim in the United States in the 1930s.[4]

Angel reports that the pelvic inlet depth index was 84.8 during the Upper Paleolithic (B.C. 30,000) and 85.0 during the Mesolithic (B.C. 9000), but dropped sharply to 76.6 during the Early Neolithic (B.C. 6500). This deterioration was associated with a transition from a diet heavy in animal proteins to one of wild grains and also with climatic changes which spread hookworm and dysentery. The somewhat erratic course of the index during the next six millennia does not particularly concern us.

[1] J. Lawrence Angel, "Paleoecology, Paleodemomography and Health," in Steven Polgar (editor), *Population, Ecology and Social Evolution*, Aldine Press, Chicago, 1975.

[2] J. Lawrence Angel, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17 of reprint.

[3] G. Nicholson, "The Two Main Diameters of the Brim of the Female Pelvis," *Journal of Anatomy*, Vol. 79, 1945, pp. 131-135.

[4] J. Lawrence Angel, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

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In Greece, during the transition from the archaic to the classical periods (B.C. 650), the brim had recovered to 84.5. It would decline to 81.7 during the Hellenistic era (B.C. 300), recover partially under the Roman Empire (120 A.D.) to 83.9, and make a remarkable advance to 89.0 in Byzantine Medieval times (1400 A.D.). By the Napoleonic era (1800 A.D.), Angel found pelvic brim depth average around 83 to 84. Then in modern times (U.S.A. 1960) there was an unprecedented and startling advance to 94.4. All these averages, with the exception of the U.S. figure, are based on small samples, but this is unfortunately a necessary condition of skeletal measurements in both prehistory and early times. Dr Angel's findings are shown in detail in the table.

Pelvic brim depth index from B.C. 30,000 *to the present*
(J. Lawrence Angel, 1975)

Period[1]	*Date*	*No.*[2]	*Pelvic Brim Depth Index*
Upper Paleolithic	B.C. 30,000	7	84.8
Mesolithic	B.C. 9000	6	85.0
Early Neolithic	B.C. 6500	10	76.6
Later Neolithic	B.C. 5000	1	75.6
Early Bronze	B.C. 3000	20	86.4
Middle Bronze: Commoners	B.C. 2000	18	81.3
Middle Bronze: Royalty	B.C. 2000	2	82.6
Late Bronze	B.C. 1500	15	78.4
Early Iron	B.C. 1150	12	78.8
Classic	B.C. 650	17	84.5
Hellenistic	B.C. 300	8	81.7
Roman Imperial	120 A.D.	10	83.9
Byzantine Medieval	1400 A.D.	2	89.0
Turkish Baroque	1800 A.D.	4	84.0
Romantic	1800 A.D.	6	83.2
U.S.A. Modern	1960 A.D.	550	94.4

[1] Period characterizations are those of Dr Angel.
[2] Smallness of some of the samples will materially reduce the degree of confidence which can be placed in the averages.

The pelvic brim acts as a filter through which the cranium of the neonate must pass. If the former is too narrow, the largest infant heads may be crushed or otherwise traumatized in birth, causing death or brain damage. In either event, they are removed from reproduction and the genetic capacity of the population to produce large-headed infants is correspondingly reduced from one generation to the next. Evolution thus adapts foetal cranial dimensions to the size of the pelvic brim.

Since there is evidence that intelligence is positively correlated with cranial size, we would expect a large pelvic inlet to favor the mental ability of populations and conversely.

Two other tentative conclusions suggest themselves: First, while the advance of civilization in the past century has damaged man's hereditary resources by permitting the survival of

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genetically damaged individuals and thus favoring the accumulation of deleterious genes, it may have had at least one other physiological effect propitious to intellect, namely, substantial widening of the pelvic aperture and hence facilitating the normal birth of unusually large-brained infants. The second tentative conclusion is that the increase in the size of the pelvic brim in modern times may widen the intelligence gap between populations which live in modern societies and populations which live in primitive ones, between healthy and unhealthy countries, and between the meat-eaters and the grain-eaters. Nevertheless, the spectacular advances in public health which have occurred and are occurring in the so-called Third World countries may well have caused significant increase in the size of the pelvic inlet.

The first obvious question to ask is: What do we really know about the comparative cranial sizes of ancient peoples and of their modern descendants? While some of the early reports of the brain-size of Cro-Magnon man were grossly exaggerated, he was significantly larger-brained than modern man. He was not, however, necessarily larger in cranial size than the modern inhabitants of those regions in which he made his greatest cultural advances. His brain probably had an average capacity of about 1590 cc.[5] This is a good deal larger than the current European average, but is comparable to contemporary averages of 1584 cc. for Spanish Basques and 1609 cc. for Auvergnois.[6] Since Angel reported large pelvic brims for Cro-Magnon man at the time that he flourished in the caves of the Dordogne, these impressive cranial sizes seem in accordance with the hypothesis.

The other evidence is more confusing. Martin and Saller inform us that Fourth Dynasty Egyptians (B.C. 2650-2500) had mean cranial capacity of 1532 cc., Tenth Dynasty Egyptians (around B.C. 2100) had averages of 1440 cc., and modern Egyptians averages of 1348 cc.[7] These differences would be highly significant if we could be sure that they were not primarily class differences. Here as elsewhere, Martin and Saller have performed an immense service in accumulating, consolidating and presenting the findings of thousands of studies of physiological anthropology, some of them dating more than a century back, but

[5] Frank E. Poirier, *Fossil Man*, Mosby, St Louis, 1973, p. 199.

[6] Rudolf Martin and Karl Saller, *Lehrbuch der Anthropologie*, Gustav Fischer Verlag, Stuttgart, Vol. II, 1959, p. 1210.

[7] Rudolf Martin and Karl Saller, *op. cit.*, p. 1216; The Earlier Egyptians had a certain amount of Atlantic (Cro-Magnon) in them. The latter were more Mediterranean. This may have accounted for some or all these differences.—EDITOR.

they have not provided the detailed information necessary for an evaluation of these studies by the reader, nor are the original sources available to the great majority of students and scholars.

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Martin and Saller report comparisons of modern Romans with Imperial Romans. No significant differences in brain size for either sex emerged.[8] Finally, a comparison of skulls from the Dark Ages (fifth to eighth centuries) in Switzerland-South Germany with their modern descendants gave a significant advantage in cranial dimensions to the latter.[9] The conclusion from all of this might be the Scottish verdict, Not Proven.

When one looks at worldwide contemporary data, there seems to be a possibly significant positive correlation between meat diet and cranial capacity. Shrubsall found that Amaxosa men averaged 1570 cc. as against Broca's figure of 1462 cc. for "Negroes," 1329 for Nubians, and 1317 for Hottentots and Bushmen, all estimates being based on the shot method.[10] The Amaxosa are a branch of the Bantu speaking peoples of the Republic of South Africa. They are cattle raisers and their traditional diet is heavy in animal proteins. In Asia, there is a progressive increase in brain-size from the largely vegetarian Hindus (1275 cc. for females) to the Chinese (1380 cc. for females) and then to the Buriats (1496 cc. for females).[11] These measurements were made with the grain and water method.

The figure given for the Buriats is fantastically high and it would imply a male Buriat average brain capacity of around 1600 cc. In fact, the Arctic peoples are almost all very large brained. Eskimos for instance average 1535 cc. for males, 1429 cc. for females. Despite some earlier theorizing and incorrectly analyzed data to the contrary, these large brains do not seem to be associated with remarkable intelligence.[12]

A tempting explanation of the large brains of Arctic peoples is simply that they evolved in an environment where agriculture was impossible and hence were confined almost entirely to a meat and fish diet. Hence, a large pelvic brim and a minimal barrier to the survival of fetuses with very large brains.

This hypothesis also seems consistent with the finding that people who evolved in hot climates tend to be smaller brained than those who evolved in cold climates. Taking Martin and Saller's tabulations for brain capacity, as measured by the grain and water method, the largest brained male averages in order of size are: Eskimo 1563, Old Bavaria 1503, Wurttemberg 1494,

[8] Rudolf Martin and Karl Saller, *op. cit.*, p. 1217.
[9] Rudolf Martin and Karl Saller, *op. cit.*, p. 1216.
[10] Rudolf Martin and Karl Saller, *op. cit.*, p. 1210.
[11] Rudolf Martin and Karl Saller, *op. cit.*, p. 1211.
[12] Richard Lynn, "Ethnic and Racial Differences in Intelligence: International Comparisons," in R. T. Osborne, C. E. Noble and N. Weyl (editors), *Human Variation: The Biopsychology of Age, Race and Sex*, Academic Press, New York, 1977, pp. 273-274.

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Tahiti, 1487 Alsace 1484 and the Maori 1479. The lowest are: Veddas 1250[13], Andaman Islanders 1281, native Australians 1310, Bushmen 1324 and African Negroes 1330. Some of these differences in brain sizes are associated with, and one might say caused by, differences in physical stature, but this is not always the case and the stature differences are not sufficient to account for the variations in cranial size.

Another possible aspect of the matter is the influence of different sorts of racial adaptation to the problem of conservation of body temperature. The Mongoloid peoples, according to this theory, represent physiological adaptation to the conservation of body heat in cold regions where outside temperature is normally well below body temperature. This problem of heat conservation involves, in other mammals as well as man, a variety of structural adaptations. The one most relevant to the present problem is that Mongoloid man tends to be stocky with a minimum area of body surface in proportion to body mass. In short, he tends towards rotundity, since the sphere provides minimal surface/mass ratio. This structure is consistent with a broad pelvic brim and hence would be conducive to permitting the passage of large-brained foetuses without frequent birth traumas.

The Negroid race, according to the same theory, represents a physiological adaptation to warm to tropical climates in which the problem of maintaining thermal body equilibrium is one of enhancing the ability for heat loss. The relevant adaptation, one among many, is development of a "skinny" somatype, one which tends to maximize skin-surface to body-mass. This provides a larger proportionate area for heat loss through sweating.

This somatype is visible in accentuated form among some of the desert Caucasoids and Hamites (Caucasoid-Negroid crosses), but it is also characteristic of some Negroid peoples. It presupposes a tendency toward a narrower pelvis, hence a smaller pelvic brim, hence a greater risk of destruction or deformation at birth of the foetuses with very large crania.

However, any sweeping dogmatic judgments on this subject should be tempered by consideration of the fact that the relevant criteria would be both the environmental challenges which have originally shaped different ethnic taxa and their subsequent readaptation and change with changes in their habitat. Thus, as we have seen, some of the Negroid peoples of the temperate zones of Africa who are also meat eaters, in particular the Amaxosa, are unusually large-brained. In the Mongoloid race, there seems to be a tendency for cranial size to reach maxima

[13] A primitive Negrito people of Sri Lanka (Ceylon).

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among peoples who have remained in extremely cold climates and hence have continued to adapt to the same challenge of heat conservation, such as Buriats, Torguts, Fuegians and Eskimos. Mongoloids who have moved into southern and south-eastern Asia and have lived their for centuries tend to be somewhat smaller brained.

The relationships between pelvic brim, cranial size and intelligence among peoples and ethnic groups need a great deal more empirical investigation before we can judge whether or not these or other hypothesized relationships are valid.

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The Intelligence of the Chinese and Malays in Singapore

By RICHARD LYNN*

In the comparatively few studies of the intelligence of Mongoloid peoples it has generally been found that they obtain approximately the same mean I.Q. as the Caucasian peoples of Europe or of European origin. In the United States the largest study is the Coleman Report (Coleman, 1966). This gives the test results of a study of some half a million American children and it was found that Mongoloid children, in contrast to Negroes and American-Indians, obtained approximately the same mean I.Q. as Caucasians. In Taiwan, Chinese children have virtually the same mean I.Q. as American and British children on Cattell's culture fair test (Rodd, 1958). In Hawaii a well drawn sample of ten-year-old Japanese children on the island of Kauai were found to have a mean I.Q. of 108 on the American Primary Mental Abilities Test (Werner *et al.*, 1968). In Japan it has been estimated that the population has a mean I.Q. of 106.6 relative to the United States mean of 100 (Lynn, 1977). Thus the evidence is beginning to mount up to indicate that Mongoloid peoples have a mean I.Q. which is at least as high as European and American Caucasians and possibly higher.

The present paper presents some further results on this question from Singapore. The data is taken from S. L. Phua's (1976) unpublished Ph.D. thesis from the University of Alberta. The thesis was designed to provide information on the intelligence level in Singapore, especially with respect to any differences that might be present between Chinese and Malays. For this purpose the author took as her sample 13-year-old boys from four representative secondary schools in Singapore. The total number of boys tested was 337. The sample is perhaps a little small, but was apparently carefully selected to be representative of the population and was evidently accepted as such by the examiners for the Ph.D. degree at the University of Alberta.

The principal intelligence test used was Raven's Progressive Matrices, a well-known test originally designed and standardised in Britain in 1939-40. The test results are presented as percentiles rather than I.Q.s, but these percentiles are easily transformed into I.Q.s based on the usual mean of 100 and SD of 15.

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The results of the study are shown in Table 1. This presents the data for Chinese and Malays separately. The first three figures in the columns are those given by Phu. The last two figures have been added by the writer and consist of the percentiles obtained by the two Singapore samples on the British norms and the equivalent I.Q. based on a British mean of 100 and SD of 15. It will be noted that the Chinese boys obtain a mean I.Q. of approximately 110 and the Malay boys of approximately 96.

TABLE 1

I.Q. differences between Chinese and Malays in Singapore

	Chinese	*Malays*
Number	147	190
Mean age	13.8	13.10
Matrices mean score	47.9	41.5
British percentile	75	40
British I.Q.	110	96

The statistical significance of the difference between the Chinese boys and the British boys in Raven's standardisation sample has been tested by the t-test and shows that the difference is highly significant ($t = 6.13$, significant at the 1 per cent level). This calculation assumes a N of 200 in the British standardisation sample and SD of 15 for both groups.

Four points in these results deserve some discussion. The first is that clearly the mean I.Q. of the Chinese in Singapore is in line with other results cited in the introduction to this paper indicating that the mean I.Q. of Mongoloid peoples is at least as high as that of European or American Caucasians. It should however be noted that these Singapore results are based on a comparison with British standardisation data collected in 1939-40. It is possible that the present-day British mean is higher and hence the contemporary British-Singapore difference less than appears in the table. Unfortunately we have not good evidence on how the British mean I.Q. may have changed over recent decades. The longest run of data on this question is that published by Burt (1969) for London school children from 1914-65, which showed an approximately constant mean I.Q. over this period. Similarly, in the United States it appears that mean population I.Q. has not changed in the post Second World War period (Roberts, 1971). Even so, it would be best to treat the British norms with some reservation because of a possible rise in mean I.Q. since the data were collected. Nevertheless, it would seem highly improbable that the British mean I.Q. has risen by more than 10 I.Q. points. It is therefore suggested that we can conclude with reasonable confidence that the mean I.Q.

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of Chinese boys in Singapore is at least as high as that of British boys and may well be higher.

A second important point arising from these results concerns the culture fairness of tests like Raven's Matrices. It has often been maintained that tests devised by white middle class Americans of Britons are biased in favour of people from these cultures and that those from other racial and ethnic groups must necessarily do poorly on them. This position can hardly be sustained in the face of the now fairly widespread findings that Mongoloid peoples in remote parts of the globe do at least as well on American and British intelligence tests as the Americans and the British. The explanation of why some racial and ethnic groups perform much more poorly on intelligence tests will surely have to be sought elsewhere.

A third point of interest in the results concerns the difference in mean I.Q. between the Chinese in Singapore and the Malays. The difference is statistically significant ($t = 8.50$) and amounts to approximately 14 I.Q. points. This is about the same as the difference between Caucasians and Negroes in the United States. It is a substantial difference and since I.Q. is an important determinant of educational attainment, income and occupational status (see, for example, Duncan, 1972) we should expect to find that the Chinese in Singapore do better in these respects than the Malays. It is well known that this is in fact the case. As early as 1837 a British traveller to Southeast Asia, G. W. Earl, observed that it was the Chinese immigrants whose "industry and perseverance have mainly contributed to the present flourishing state of the settlement" (Earl, 1837). An estimate of per capita incomes for 1947 indicated that the per capita income of the Malays was only approximately 40 per cent of that of the Chinese (Silcock, 1963).

A final point of interest in the results concerns the light it throws on the effect of economic conditions on a population's I.Q. It is sometimes maintained that the low mean I.Q. which is generally characteristic of impoverished groups within advanced nations (e.g. Negroes and slum dwellers in the U.S.A. and Britain) is an effect of their poverty. The high I.Q. obtained by the Chinese in Singapore must throw considerable doubt on this position. The children whose I.Q.s are reported in this paper were born around the year 1963 and in this year the per capita income in Singapore was 487 U.S. dollars compared with 1298 dollars in Britain and 2562 dollars in the U.S.A. Yet this relative poverty does not seem to have had any deleterious effects on the I.Q. in Singapore. This suggests that in Britain and the U.S.A. it is the low I.Q. of certain groups that is responsible for their poverty rather than the reverse.

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Mules and Mulattoes*

By KIAMRAN HALIL

INTRODUCTION

It is common knowledge that the mule is a horse-donkey hybrid. In Spanish *mulo* (*mulus* and *mula* in Latin) means "mule"; *mulato* is "young mule," while *mula,* as in Latin, means "she-mule." In Mexico *mulata* is the feminine of "mulatto." The *Oxford English Dictionary* gives "mulatress" and "mulata" for female mulatto but indicates that the latter word is now obsolete.[1]

As is well known, "mullato" is the term in general use by anthropologists, geneticists, and experts in the domain of human heredity to describe the offspring from a Negro-White cross. However, at the risk of stating the obvious, perhaps it should be stressed at the outset that the term "mulatto" is not used to describe the offspring of, say, Mongoloid-Australoid or Caucasoid-Mongoloid crosses; the issue of these other races are simply referred to as hybrids. The strongest common denominator between the mule and the mulatto is that both are hybrids.

The prime purpose of this paper is to discuss the true implications of the term "mulatto" with particular regard to the relevance of the word "mule" from which it derives; to point out certain significant genetic factors common to both while highlighting some equally important genetic differences; and, by way of conclusion, to remark that the expression "mulatto," for the reasons to be explained, is a misnomer which in the sphere of human heredity has come to be deployed as a nomenclature to describe the phenotypes of two racially distinct genotypes.

THE MULE

According to Darlington "true mule, where the mare is the mother, is a bigger animal than the hinney when the she-ass is the mother."[2] He also states that in other respects the influence

* This paper is an expanded version of an article under the same title first published in the *Anthropological Journal of Canada,* Vol. 14, No. 3, 1976, pp. 10-13.

[1] Cf. however "macaca mulatta" which is the Rhesus macaque (monkey): see B. Grzimek (editor-in-chief), *Animal Life Encyclopedia,* Van Nostrand Reingold Company, New York; London, etc., Vol. 10, 1972, p. 406; J. R. Baker, *Race,* Oxford University Press, London and New York, 1974, pp. 162, 164; see also note 20 below.

[2] C. D. Darlington, *Genetics and Man*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1964, p. 42.

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of the two parents is equal whichever way the cross is made.[3] It is generally agreed—since biblical times[4]—that the male is sterile, though until the formulation of the biological reasoning for this phenomenon the matter continued to attract the curiosity of many people. For example, Dr Baker draws attention to this problem in his recent vastly learned work[5] by reproducing an interesting extract from John Ray's book *The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of the Creation,* published in 1691 which runs thus:

> . . . why that hybridinous production should not again generate, and so a new race be carried on but that Nature should stop here and proceed no further is to me a mystery and unaccountable.

The technical reasoning referred to above, as is now fully acknowledged, is to the effect that if members of different species do copulate together, their offspring—if they are produced—are infertile.[6] John Hunter, the Scottish surgeon and naturalist, argued that the true distinction between different species must ultimately be gathered from their incapacity of propagating with each other an offspring capable of continuing itself by subsequent propagations.[7] Dr Gayre of Gayre puts the matter in clearer perspective when he says: "... In certain genera the various species have not evolved on very closely parallel lines, and these differences, which reflect fundamental differences in the chromosomes, have led to the inability to produce fertile offspring. This is the case of the mule.[8] But it should be noted that female mules are *alleged* to be occasionally fertile.[9]

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] See G. Cansdale, *Animals in Bible Lands,* Paternoster Press, 1970, p. 79.

[5] J. R. Baker, *op. cit.,* p. 73.

[6] *Ibid.,* quoting from G. L. L. de Buffon's *Histoire Naturelle des Animaux.* See, too, F. Jacob, *The Logic of Living Systems* (translated by B. E. Spillman), Allen Lane, 1974, p. 51 for further quotation from de Buffon.

[7] J. R. Baker, *op. cit.,* p. 74.

[8] R. Gayre of Gayre, *Miscellaneous Racial Studies,* Volume II, 1957-1972, The Armorial, 1972, p. 78.

[9] E. W. Sinott *et al., Principles of Genetics,* McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., New York, 1953, p. 228; R. C. King, *A Dictionary of Genetics,* Oxford University Press, London and New York, 2nd ed., 1972, p. 189; for a discussion on this subject, see A. P. Gray, *Mammalian Hybrids,* Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux, Slough, 2nd ed., 1972, p. 95; see also C. P. Groves, *Horses, Asses and Zebras,* David and Charles, Newton Abbot, 1974, p. 34, where it is alleged that probably under 1 per cent of female mules are fertile! Compare, however, C. R. Austin and R. V. Short (editors), *Reproduction in Mammals,* Cambridge University Press, 1972, pp. 29-32 where the mule's fertility is seriously doubted.

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It is manifest that as a beast of burden the mule is a strong animal; it possesses the combination of the strength of the horse with the endurance of the ass. Thus, its strength and stamina is scientifically recognised to be based on the genetic principle that race hybrids exhibit traces of *heterosis* (hybrid vigour).[10] Many eminent writers[11] have, however, pointed out that apart from the classic example of the mule the occurrence of such luxuriance is less well known in animals than in plants. And one leading authority[12] has emphasised that this phenotypic luxuriance of the mule, although proverbial, does *not* constitute Darwinian fitness.

MULATTOES

As has been mentioned earlier there exists general agreement among scientists in the use of the term " mulatto " as a description of the hybrid offspring of crosses between Negroes and white persons. The appellation is not confined to the first generation (F_1). When two mulattoes marry, their children, namely, the new hybrids in the second generation (F_2)—who may be of various gradations,[13] such as, black, dark, medium, light, or white—are, as Dr A. Scheinfeld informed the writer, also called mulattoes.[14] This is so even of white (or near-white) hybrids which is a 1-to-16 possibility. Such hybrids possess Negroid genes easily noticeable particularly by ethnologically or genetically trained observers. Similarly, in the backcross mulatto X white the issue, *i.e.*, quadroons, are also designated as mulattoes. The same applies to the backcross quadroon X white the outcome of which are the so-called octoroons. There being no authority to the contrary, presumably in the backcross mulatto X Negro, or quadroon X Negro, the progeny are also called mulattoes.

[10] C. Stern, *Principles of Human Genetics,* W. H. Freeman and Company, San Francisco and London, 2nd ed., 1960, p. 699; C. C. Li, *Population Genetics,* University of Chicago Press, 6th impression (1968), of the 1955 edition, p. 290; T. Dobzhansky, *Genetics of the Evolutionary Process,* London and New York, 1970, p. 306.

[11] See, for example, A. Müntzing, *Genetic Research,* L. T. Förlag, Stockholm, 1961, p. 213.

[12] E. Mayr, *Animal Species and Evolution,* The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 3rd impression, 1966, pp. 111-112.

[13] A. Scheinfeld, *Heredity in Humans,* Chatto and Windus, 1972, p. 58; for a more detailed exposition of the variability of pigmentation, see C. Stern, *op. cit.,* pp. 352-253.

[14] Personal communication. This view is expressly supported by R. W. Pennak, *Collegiate Dictionary of Zoology,* the Ronald Press Company, New York, 1964, p. 330, where " mulatto " is defined as: " (a) persons having one Negro and one white parent; (b) the intermediate grade of skin color of such a person or of some members of later generations." Significantly, a brief item on " mulatto " in *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* 15th edition, 1973, reveals that " originally it denoted only F_1 offspring."

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" Quadroon " and " octoroon " are not genetic terms. Dr Scheinfeld has assured the writer that they are really social terms.[15] On the other hand, in Mexico degrees of hybridity were variously specified.[16] For instance, the nomenclature applied to a mulatress was *mulata*; *morisca*[17] (*morisco* for male) stood for quadroon; *alvina* (*alvino* for male) seems to have been the equivalent of octoroon, while *tornatrás,*[18] generally as with the term " mestizo," meant half-breed or half-caste. It should be observed that there were other terms to cover various possibilities of intermarriage between Europeans, Indians, and hybrids.[19]

The Mexican nomenclature raises two queries: (a) in anthropology and human genetics " mulatto " is nearly always used in connection with both male and female mulattoes: the masculine would seem to include the feminine, just as " mankind " invariably connotes " womankind ";[20] (b) there are no special genetic (or social) terms by which individuals with 1/16 or 1/32 Negro ancestry may be described: along with F_1 mulattoes, quadroons and octoroons they are simply referred to as " mulattoes." It should be noted, however, that although American anthropologists and geneticists in common with their fellow-scientists on this side of the Atlantic strictly adhere to the terminology " mulatto," in the United States hybrids between Europeans and Negroes are classified socially, and in many areas legally, as Negroes (despite the fact that the American Negro is often a mulatto), whatever the proportions of their contributing

[15] Personal communication.

[16] H. Pirie-Gordon, " Hybrid Nomenclature," THE MANKIND QUARTERLY, Vol. I, No. 3, January-March 1961, p. 209; C. C. Cumberland, *Mexico*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1968, p. 55. And in South America there are a number of officially recognised hybrid classes: see K. F. Dyer, *The Biology of Integration*, Scientechnica (Publishers) Ltd., Bristol, 1974, p. 6, and, in particular, V. Alba, *The Latin Americans,* Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1969, p. 34.

[17] CF. extract in *OED* from J. Deniker, *Races of Man,* 2nd edition, edited by Havelock Ellis, the Walter Scott Publishing Company, 1900, p. 542 which reads: " A mulatto woman, the offspring of a Spaniard and a negress, may give birth to a morisco by uniting with a Spaniard."

[18] This word is roughly synonymous with the technical expression " segregation ": see H. D. Swanson, *Human Reproduction,* Oxford University Press, New York, 1974, *glossary,* but its dictionary meaning, like that given for *saltatrás* or *salto atrás,* is either *" reversion," " throwback,"* or *" backward leap."*

[19] H. Pirie-Gordon, *loc. cit.*

[20] But the *adjective* " mulatto " is used for both genders; as a *noun* the masculine is " mulatto " and the feminine is " mulatress." The following sentence is in accord with this grammatical rule: " The *spahi* had a mulatto mistress . . ." (as used by W. B. Cohen, " Literature and Race." *Race and Class,* Vol. XVI, No. 2, October 1974, p. 197).

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genes,[21] though in Louisiana a law promulgated in 1970 has classed an individual having 1/32 negro blood as a white person.[22]

Be this as it may, according to anthropologists and geneticists on both sides of the Atlantic racial hybrids of the kind under discussion are labelled " mulattoes." The question posed in this paper is directed at the scientific justification (if any) for such interracial hybrids to be called " mulattoes." Works on anthropology and genetics (including articles in professional journals) do not, as far as the writer is aware, put forward a cogent reason for the usage of this particular terminology. Instead, it is said that the term in question derives its origin from the mule which ironically happens to be the best-known example of hybrid sterility in the *animal* kingdom!

Apart from this consideration, the acid truth is that the science of human genetics has not coined an original term of its own. A perusal of the *Oxford English Dictionary* under " mulatto " and " mule " (which conveniently appear on the same page) will clearly show that not only is " mulatto " *obscurely* derived from *mulo* but that it has been used since the sixteenth century in various literary works by some authors in referring to the tawny-coloured offspring of racially mixed unions.

COMPARISONS

In making instructive comparisons between the mule and racial hybrids, for some obscure reason, only those aspects which represent (or justify) similarities are being dwelt upon. For instance, the phenomenon of *heterosis* (referred to previously) is somewhat strongly relied upon. But this vigour,[23] although present in both mules and mulattoes is either gradually reduced or, as is normally the case, completely lost in F_2 or subsequent generations of mulattoes. By contrast, there is good authority that although studies of half-breed Indians as well as hybrids from Hottentot and Boer crosses have revealed *heterosis* to a marked degree, the conditions does not seem to be evident in certain black-white crosses.[24]

The following are additional dissimilarities of considerable importance: (a) the sterility of the mule *vis-à-vis* the fertility (in the generality of cases) of human hybrids; and (b) mulattoism, *i.e.*, the possibility of mulattoes mating with each other and thus producing other mulattoes (or, for that matter, new hybrids).

[21] K. F. Dyer, *loc. cit.*; C. C. Li, *op. cit.*, p. 312.
[22] A. Scheinfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 242.
[23] See generally, K. F. Dyer, *op. cit.*, p. 142.
[24] A. M. Elliott, *Zoology*, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 4th edition, 1968, p. 575.

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Not so with mules: no muleism here! While the mule is unable to procreate and perpetuate itself, mulattoism is capable of creating, as the case may be, a micro-race in an habitat, an isolate,[25] or on a small island (as in Martinique[26]) on the basis of the so-called "founder-principle." For, an interracial hybrid population may give rise to a recognizable new ethnic taxon by intermarriage within itself, generation by generation.[27] Of micro-races so created there are many other examples. One micro-race which appears to have been overlooked by anthropologists and geneticists has recently been discussed in some detail by the present writer in another paper.[28]

Another significant difference is exemplified by the cross between a she-ass and a stallion the outcome being what is technically called a hinny which is not a "true mule." In the case of racial hybrids, however, the fact that the mother is of Negroid stock and the father white Caucasoid or *vice versa* is of no consequence. All mulattoes born out of such liaisons, be they legal or casual, are "true mulattoes," as it were.

For yet a further inconsistency, it is sufficient to remember that in Spanish *mulato* means "young mule" and argue that since "mulatto" is the term applied to human hybrids right across the board regardless of age this constitutes a contradiction in terms. One is therefore almost tempted to ask why the more elderly hybrids are not called "muloes"?

The crucial determinant as respects any biological similarity alleged to exist between mules and mulattoes is perhaps the "extinction" of the mule phenotype after F_1 whereas human hybrids continue—all things being equal—to produce progeny *inter se* or *inter alios*. To continue, therefore, to call such F_2 (and subsequent) generation of hybrids "mulattoes," especially with the disappearance of the factor of *heterosis*, is logically untenable though, it would seem, otherwise genetically.

When Leonardo da Vinci propounded his theory on the equality of male and female contributions to heredity by writing in his Notebooks: [29]

[25] Cf. the Dunkers isolate in Franklyn County, Pennsylvania: see B. K. Sladen *et al.*, *Biology of Populations*, American Elsevrier Publishing Company, Inc., New York, 1969, p. 182, and P. R. Ehrlick *et al.*, *The Process of Evolution*, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1974, p. 159; also A. M. Elliott, *loc. cit.*, for the celebrated example of Pitcairn Island.

[26] K. F. Dyer, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

[27] J. R. Baker, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

[28] Kiamran Halil, "The Structure of the Turkish-Cypriot Race," THE MANKIND QUARTERLY, Vol. XV, No. 2, October-December 1974, pp. 124-134.

[29] As quoted in G. Dahlberg, *Race, Reason and Rubbish* (translated by L. Hogben), George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1942, p. 40.

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> The black races of Ethiopia are not products of the sun: for if black gets black in Scythia, the offspring is black: but if black gets a white woman with child, the offspring is grey. And this shows that the seed of the mother has power in the embryo equally with the father,

he sufficed himself by describing the offspring as "grey" and not "mulatto" despite the fact that he was aware of the existence of the mule and of its physical fitness!

CONCLUSIONS

(a) It is submitted that the term "mulatto" is a misnomer. The issue of Negro-White unions are being referred to as "mulattoes" but interchangeably with the word "hybrid." Since what are intended to be designated are nothing but intermediaries or intermediates, or, so to speak, in-betweens *qua* the hybridinous offspring of Negro-White crosses, the new hybrids of such offspring (arising out of matings *inter se*), and the outcome of backcrosses, they could be uniformly called cross-breeds.[30] Where, however, the context calls for the avoidance of confusion with the hybrids of interracial fusions other than Negro-White blendings, it is suggested that it would be preferable if some genetic or generic term were to be devised for appropriate use.

(b) Recourse to the imprecise denomination "mulatto," as conceded by the *OED* to be obscurely derived from *mulo,* has no scientific basis. Dr E. Klein[31] attempts to shed some light on this obscurity by pointing out that the term "was influenced in form by a folk-etymological association with *mulo*" but this endeavour was by no means aimed at justifying any scientific significance. On the contrary, Dr Klein's elucidation is strongly suggestive of the lack of it.

(c) In relation to the people of the Atlantic islands from Bermuda to Tobago and Belize which are primarily inhabited by Negroes and mulattoes, Professor Coon states[32] that the term "mulatto" in this connection is clearly an over-simplification of a complex genetic situation considering that this area has a history of 400 years of undocumented racial mixture. Unfortunately he does not suggest an alternative word, let alone a

[30] Or by some other name. Compare the expression "racial-breed" by which Dr Gayre of Gayre describes a stable hybrid: see Gayre of Gayre, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

[31] See E. Klein, *A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language*, Elsevrier Publishing Company Ltd., New York and London, 1967, under "mulatto."

[32] C. S. Coon, *The Living Races of Man,* Jonathan Cape, 1966, pp. 296-297.

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scientfic substitute; but he indicates the inaptness of the word (in this particular context) by putting it between inverted commas.

(d) It is, therefore, surprising that so far the use of the term in question has not, unlike "hybridisation"[33] and a few other expressions,[34] attracted controversy. Surely, that cannot be a reason for not doubting or questioning its aptness or accuracy in the context to which this analysis has been devoted. One is left wondering what other term would have been thought up[35] had the mule phenotype not been so readily available!

[33] K. F. Dyer, *op. cit.*, p. 141; E. Mayr, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

[34] The word "Moor," for example, which two French anthropologists had suggested as long ago as 1895 "to be banished from ethnographic terminology": see R. Collignon and J. Deniker, "Les Maures du Sénégal," *L'Anthropologie*, 1895, p. 287; and J. Deniker, *op. cit.*, p. 435.

[35] New terms have in fact been known to have been invented in other contexts: see, for example, H. W. Hitzeroth, "The Second Congress of the South African Genetic Society," THE MANKIND QUARTERLY, Vol. III, No. 3, January-March 1963, p. 162 respecting the terms *unigen* or *ethnomonad* (for cases where by isolation and/or selection over a sufficiently long period a relatively uniform type has evolved) and *diversigen* (for cases of new, highly heterogeneous groups of no particular ethnological character) coined by Dr Gayre of Gayre; and see further, Gayre of Gayre, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

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Hoodoo: The Indigenous Medicine and Psychiatry of the Black American

By RALPH R. KUNA

In the growing volume of literature on transcultural psychiatric studies of indigenous healers, the "Hoodoo doctor" has been too long overlooked. The minimal amount of material about this type of folk healer reveals a failure to discriminate Hoodoo from other cultural systems of healing (Cappannari 1975; Hall and Bourne 1973; Michaelson 1972; Rocereto 1973; Saphir *et al.* 1967; Snell 1967; Snow 1974; Tinling 1967; Wintrob 1973). The indigenous "Hoodoo doctor" should not be confused with the Voodoo priest-doctor. The former, a product of Black American culture, is quite common (Haskins 1974; Herskovitz 1941; Hurston 1931; Hyatt 1935, 1970, 1973, 1975; Nott 1922; Puckett 1926), whereas the latter is rarely, if ever, found in the United States. In fact, the Hoodoo doctor is often shunned by the few Voodoo societies in the United States (Puckett 1926: 191).

The present paper will attempt—*with limited data*—to adumbrate the actual distinction between Hoodoo doctors and other indigenous healers and to clarify the healing aspects of the American Blacks' Hoodoo doctor in relation to the interaction of situational and psychological factors in the Black community.

HOODOO AS A FORM OF FOLK MEDICINE AND PSYCHOTHERAPY

Hoodoo, as a system of native Black American folk psychotherapy and psychiatry, was defined by Hyatt (1935) as "a complex belief and practice involving almost every aspect of life . . . witchcraft or Hoodoo is a magic rite—whether acted out according to a formula or merely intended or wished—against someone's welfare" (p. 24). The core of this system, according to Hyatt, is "to catch a spirit, or to protect your spirit against the catching, or to release your caught spirit; this is the complete theory and practice of Hoodoo" (p. 361). Moreover, Hoodoo is flexible, amorphous, and constantly changing to suit changing times, conditions, and personalities.

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A person can "lay" or "plant a root" for another—to "catch the spirit of another." The victim, however, is not entirely helpless. He can, with the proper guidance and help from a "root worker" or "root doctor," turn the spell or "trick" against the person initiating it. Once the Hoodoo doctor has performed this highly respected act, the "homing" principle returns the spell infallibly to the initiator. For guidance in such cases, one goes to a specialist who has made a study of of these matters—the Hoodoo doctor.

Hoodoo doctors may be white—not necessarily Cajun—and Catholic (see Hurston 1931) or a member of any Christian denomination. They are, however, predominantly male. One may become a Hoodoo doctor in any one of three ways: (1) by being born with the gift; (2) by receiving the "call"; or (3) by learning the profession from another, or serving an apprenticeship.

Hoodoo doctors have rather well-defined professional duties. These include (1) diagnosis; (2) finding out who "laid the trick"; and (3) curing the patient by either destroying the trick or administering "roots" or "herbs" from a Hoodoo bag. There is no general agreement about which roots and herbs should be used. Hurston (1931) states that "Anything may be conjure, nothing may be conjure, according to the doctor, the time and the use of the article" (p. 411).

Hoodoo doctors are often distinguished from "root doctors" because the Hoodoo doctor's speciality is medicine. But some Hoodoo activities, usually known as signs, are felt to have little to do with the Hoodoo doctor. This accords with the distinctions between practitioners of medicine (Hoodoo) and those of magic (signs), where forms of sorcery may take place (Puckett 1926, p. 31; Herskovitz 1941, p. 239; Cameron 1930, p. 364). Hoodoo doctors may also specialize and may have specialities ranging from warding off death to bringing it about.

The Hoodoo doctor is usually a respected but feared member of his community. He, like healers in the Euro-American tradition, has both medical and social power. As Young (1976, pp. 15-16) points out:—

> The power of healers (diagnosticians as well as therapists) has two aspects, then. One is practical and the other is social. The first refers to powed accumulated and controlled by the healer in order to compete with pathogenic agencies, so that he can produce a remission of symptoms [see Glick, 1967; Jansen, 1973, pp. 139-140]. This aspect can be measured according to how powerful are the pathogenic agencies that must be countered (that is, the seriousness of the symptoms they produce and their ability to

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resist therapies), and how common these prophylactic, diagnostic, or therapeutic abilities are in a particular society. The social aspect of power refers to someone's ability to communicate and legitimize his choice of exculpating circumstances. This aspect of power can be measured according to the seriousness of the social consequences of exculpation for the sick person and other principles in the episode. The two aspects of power are closely linked, since it is through diagnosis and therapy that the choice of exculpating circumstances must be communicated and legitimized. . . . It is by his choice of translators that the sick person can exercise control over what sorts of translations are possible, and what sorts of audiences will be mobilized during the episode.

HOODOO VERSUS WEST AFRICAN AND HAITIAN VOODOO

One of the basic differences between American Hoodoo and Haitian Voodoo is that Hoodoo, although a system of belief and therapy, is not a cult, nor does it engage in cult or group activities or worship. Although both systems are concerned with spirits, their mythological structure and content vary enough culturally to have quite different processes of diagnosing and treating disorders.

A comparison clarifies the distinction. If a Black American is ailing and believes he has been "Hoodooed," he visits a Hoodoo doctor "to turn the trick." The trick is a spell in the form of a "spirit" that has been placed on someone by another. In finding out who initiated the trick and in dealing with it, *the Hoodoo doctor does not assume the role of intermediary with a higher spiritual world.* Rather, he deals directly with "spirits" arising from and functioning in interpersonal relations.

The cultural attitudes fostered by both Hoodoo and Voodoo, however, nurture the phenomena of autosuggestion and conversion. The Hoodoo doctor is autonomous and prescribes and cures the individual patient. Voodoo, on the other hand, is characterized by the following: (1) devotion to a deity or deities: (2) ceremonial music and dancing, with specific meaning accorded to particular spirits; (3) collectivized tension, excitement, ritual, and possession behavior; (4) the presence of the *houngan,* in his rôle as healer and intermediary possessed by *loa* (spirits) and supported by group possession; and (5) a sacrificial offering. None of these occurrences is characteristic of Hoodoo. Voodoo, unlike Hoodoo, is invariably group oriented. Also, in Voodoo, *mamaloi* or priestesses abound, such as Marie

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Laveau, the Voodoo Queen of New Orleans, as opposed to the Hoodoo doctor which is almost always a man.

HOODOO VERSUS JAMAICAN OBEAH AND BRAZILIAN UMBANDA

In general, the features that distinguish Hoodoo from Haitian Voodoo apply as well to other forms of West Indian or South American "Voodou" such as Jamaican *Obeah* and Brazilian *Umbanda.* Both of these features are absent in American Hoodoo. In Brazilian Umbanda, the person presiding over a meeting is known as a "medium" who serves as a "horse" for the possessing spirit, who is seen as "mounting" or entering the medium (Figge 1975).

A specific case may serve to highlight the differences between Hoodoo and the various forms of West Indian and South American Voodoo. In this case, recorded by Hyatt (1973, Vol. 3, p. 503), the spirit is *on* a patient and he has gone to a Hoodoo doctor to be cured. An indigenous diagnosis is made and treatment prescribed with no religious or group overtones; that is, no syncretic cult activities are to be found, nor is a consultation with a higher spiritual world. The taped question-answer session is presented as it was recorded.

Q: In taking off a spell and using the wood herbs, do you use the same thing for all spells or do you use different herbs for different spells?
A: Yo' use some in de-lak yo' use watah.
Q: How do you do that?
A: Don' let de watah hit de groun, ketch de watah 'fo' [before] it hit de groun'.
Q: Rain water?
A: Dat's right. Ketch it in de glass, pitchah, ketch it above de groun'. Don' even let de watah drap [drop] off de top of de house. Set it [container] out one side upon a shelf an' de rain come until it git full. If yo' ain't got it full, de' [they] take an' po' out dat an' git it [water] till yo' git it [container full]—de rain watah. An' take it fo' a wash *regardless of whut kinda spirit 'got on yo'.* In nine days' time yo' will be all right. But yo' gotta wash. Ketch about a half a gallon or a gallon an' yo' don' throw de watah away aftar yo' firs' wash. Yo' wash yo' face in dat. Yo' kin wash yo' han' in any othah watah, but chew wash yo' face an' haid in dat watah. Den po' dat [rain] watah in anothah jah [jar] an' let dat stay. Tomorrah mawnin' yo' git up, yo' do de same thing, yo' wash yo' face an' hair [in the preserved

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rain water]. An' de nex' day yo' wash in de nex' watah dat wus had fer nine days. Den yo'll put all dose watahs tuhgethah, all in one, an' dey travels to de sundown way.

Q: To the sundown what?

A: To de sundown side.

Q: Sundown side. Well, you said "way" didn't you?

A: Well, in de way dat da sun go downat—see, out in de wes'. Yo' turn yo' back to de lef' at de lef' cornah. Yo' turn yo' back to de lef' an' wave dis bottle ovah yo' haid [demonstrates].

Q: You swing it around over your head.

A: Yes, an' let all de watah po' out. Dat yo' see. Den yo' throw dis stuff by turnin' dis bottle loose [so that] de' [dey = they] all go out. Turn 'em [loose, the nine waters] an' let 'em stay. An' day [the patient] walk off from de house, say, "Go." Tell 'em to take an' carry 'em wherevah day come from. Den he go back where he come from. An' whosoevah brought on de spell, it is off. Ah'll bet anything or not dat it's off.

Q: Now, you take this rain water that you catch, a half-gallon or a gallon, and you wash in that nine days. The same water?

A: Yes, de same watah.

Q: Nine days, and then you throw it to the west back over your head; but you swing it around over your head when you do that—in a glass jar or something.

A: Ovah yo' lef' shouldah.

Q: And you don't look back—walk away.

A: Yes.

From this brief discussion, it appears that the Hoodoo doctor remains crucial to the socio-cultural constructed "symbolic reality" of the Black American. If this is recognized, a comparative approach to medical healing in Hoodoo could be revealing. As Kleinman (1973, p. 133) points out:

> A phenomenology of healing practices and a general model of the healing relationship and process is precisely what is required for a clearer and more critical understanding of the systems of medical care as well as for efforts aimed at restructuring modern forms of medical care.
>
> Symbolic reality neither denotes the realm of actual events and biological processes nor the personal subjectivity of the individual; rather, it represents the mediating social and cultural world of ideas, values, sentiments, meaningful symbolic forms, social relations and the like; that is, the sphere of socially legitimated human reality in which most

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of us function and work. *It is within a given society's symbolic reality that medical systems exist and function, as do all other cultural systems; thus illness is shaped into human experience, and that healing takes place.* (Author's emphasis.)

HOODOO VERSUS OTHER NORTH AMERICAN METHODS OF FOLK HEALING

The distinguishing characteristics of Hoodoo have been generally overlooked by such researchers as Snow, who has lumped Hoodoo and other forms of folk healing together. In her article entitled "Folk Medical Beliefs and Their Implications for Care of Patients" (1974), Snow—misled perhaps by superficial similarities—included Hoodoo among folk medical systems such as those of the Pennsylvania Dutch, the Hutterites, the Amish, the Appalachian Whites, the Cajuns of Louisiana, Kansas farmers, Puerto Ricans, and Mexicans without making the necessary distinctions. Yet Hoodoo is basically different from all these forms of folk medicine.

It is true that in most of the above-mentioned systems, all indigenous to continental North America with the sole exception of the Puerto Rican, the curing is not group oriented or syncretic as in West Indian or South American Voodoo. But differences do exist. Even though curing is done individually, it usually has a religious orientation, usually Catholic in the case of Puerto Ricans or Mexicans, usually some form of Protestant fundamentalism in the case of the Hutterites, Amish, and Pennsylvania Dutch. In all these groups, God is seen as the ultimate healer.

The Pennsylvania Dutch "powwowers" regard the Bible as particularly effective in curing a "hexed" patient. Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Dutch powwower has yet another feature that distinguishes him or her from the Hoodoo doctor. The powwower will frequently "draw" the disorder from the patient's body into his own. The powwower, in effect, "takes on" (absorbs) the illness of the patient (Guthrie 1966). This is something no Hoodoo doctor would consider doing.

In the shamanistic cult activities of the American Indian, deities and gods are invariably involved. The ceremonies are usually group oriented, thus distinguishing this form of indigenous medicine from Hoodoo. In addition, the collectivized tension, ceremonial dancing, and trance-like state of the participants in many American Indian medicinal activity make this type of folk medicine more akin to Voodoo than Hoodoo.

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Hoodoo also appears to have little in common with the Pentecostal sects of both Haiti and the United States. Both of these sects are, unlike Hoodoo, group, God, and possession oriented. Possession in this case represents the phenomenon of glossolalia or "speaking in tongues."

Attention should be paid to similarities, but inter- and intra-cultural variations of symboliic realities in their relationships to illness are of major concern if ethno-psychiatry is to make a meaningful contribution.

THE CLINICAL AND ETHNO-PSYCHIATRIC MEANING OF HOODOO

There appear to be four continua in the cultural evolution of Hoodoo: (1) the development of Hoodoo itself through a synthesis of Christian or Catholic beliefs and, sometimes, Protestant fundamentalism; (2) the priestly cult and collendrical healing ceremonies of Voodoo evolving into the practices of the individually trained and independently practicing Hoodoo doctor; (3) the evolution of Hoodoo practices from rural, provincial areas to urban, industrial cities, predominantly in the North; (4) the evolution of behavior disorders according to cultural patterns logically creating the consequent movement from conversion and hysteriform disorders, involving the voluntary neuromuscular or sensory-perceptual systems, to the Euro-American psycho-somatic form of illness founded on disordered functioning of the autonomic and vegetative bodily systems.

Continuum 4, it should be noted, can only be hypothetical on the basis of general differences apparent between the urban clinical (etic) cases of Tinling (1967), Wintrob (1973), Cappannari (1975), and the descriptive (emic) examples of Hyatt's ethnographic observations (1935, 1965, 1970, 1975). Hyatt's rural examples tend to resemble hysteriform disorders, in contrast to the somatic preoccupations, delusional systems, and psychosomatic illness of the urban cases.

A further point to be considered is the functioning of autosuggestion and conversion involved in the trance-possession syndromes of illiterate or primitive cultures. Here, various symbols or scapegoats within the pressure parameters of kin and family relations allow inadequacies and frustrations to be projected in a culturally channeled manner—witchcraft. This does not occur in modern cultural conditions, where the schizophrenic with paranoid reaction in his idiosyncratic belief system and notions of persecutions is to be expected in the anomic conditions and economic arrangements so typical of Euro-American culture. Hence, in differential diagnosis, Hoodoo

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beliefs, particularly as they function in cultural doctrines of belief in witchcraft, can hardly be seen as *atypical* content of paranoid schizophrenic reaction.

The shift in Continuum 3 may be the causative basis for the dysfunctionality of historic Hoodoo beliefs in Black American culture. Such dysfunctioning cultural processes can be considered pathogenic. Signs of this phenomenon have been reported by Weiner (1969), who found that more than half of the Blacks he interviewed believe their health has rapidly diminished during the last three generations. Two-thirds of urban Black Americans revealed to Brunswick and Josephen (1972) that they "feel sick" and at least three-fourths of adolescent Harlem Blacks expect "sickness" for the better part of their lives. Finally, Cornely (1968) tells us that the mortality and morbidity rate between Whites and Blacks is continually widening.

The effect of Continuum 3 on healing processes may also be disastrous. While the problems of industrialized existence continue to place massive stress on traditional Black culture, its rate of disintegration increases. Persistent disregard of Black culture by the Anglo medical establishment only intensifies the already high rates of mental and physical disorder within the Black American culture. Caught up in this process, the Hoodoo doctor, although enjoying a culturally prestigious and advantageous rôle for curing, is clearly unable to cure many of the psychosomatic illnesses.

However, not only the Hoodoo doctor is hampered in treating illness. The clinical cases of Tinling, Snell, Wintrob, and Cappannari clearly outline the problems involved when allopathic medicine attempts to treat a Black who attributes the origins of his disease to an etiology within a culturally-constituted symbolic reality which is not understood by the treating physician. The physicians found themselves unable to enter such realities. While the Hoodoo doctor may be able to treat the psychological conditions, he will inevitably fail with many of the somatic aspects. Since the reverse is the reality for modern medicine, a "peaceful coexistence," such as Wintrob recommends, must be sought.

Much has been written on the psychiatric effects of urbanization on American Indians. Virtually nothing, however, has been done on similar etiology for Black American psychopathology. According to the principles of social psychiatry, there should be little difference between the *function* of the Native American Church and Black American Hoodoo. That is, both function as a reaction to the cultural conditions of existence, maintain social support-identity-solidarity, and, finally and most importantly, are

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culturally-sanctioned means of alleviating interpersonal stresses inherent in any culture. Indeed Suttles (1971) has advanced the theory that such activities are not only culturally functional and integrative for Black American culture, but psychologically healthy as well.

In every article of medical literature dealing with the subject of Hoodoo, the physicians were in agreement on one point: most of their patients arrived at both their disorder and final cure within their culturally-constituted symbolic reality. "Often times," reported Kimball (1970), "the modern medicine man finds it expedient to seek out the services of a 'root-doctor'" who can exorcise the spell cast over a patient. "Such a person has followed his or her people north. At the University of Rochester, the author and his colleagues had on a number of occasions to utilize the services of root-work" (p. 803). Kimball's patient, however, did not return to the medical clinic, but probably sought the services of a Hoodoo doctor. In such cases the symptoms are non-specific. Often there is an organic explanation for the symptom—for example, tuberculosis of the bone; but the victim will not accept legitimate medical interventions unless roots are also worked. There are indications that because of anxiety or other emotions induced via roots non-specific physiologic alterations occur that may explain such phenomena as sudden death, syncope, and pseudocyesis that are sometimes found in relation to roots.

Tinling, of the University of Rochester, contends: —

> The burden is on the doctor to ask the appropriate questions . . . "Do you mean that someone is working roots on you?" or, "Could it be roots?" . . . The physician must remember that the patient or his family may see the root-doctor as the only person who could help the patient. *Depending upon the circumstances, it may be wise for a physician to allow the patient to seek such help.* (Author's emphasis.)

Four of Dr Tinling's seven patients received their final cure after having seen a Hoodoo doctor. Cappannari's (1975) patient who suffered from regional enteritis, emerged from a hypnosis-like state induced by a fundamentalist Baptist minister, who had Hoodoo affiliations, reading biblical passages concerning the casting out of demons. This apparently dispelled the "hex" and cured the patient.

A question arises: whether modern medicine, including psychiatry, can successfully collaborate with the practitioners of Hoodoo. Hes has stated that the therapist in particular is faced with the following decisions: (1) to fight shamanism as unmedical

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and unscientific; (2) to find a compromise or division of labor between the shaman and the occidental therapist; or (3) to accept shamanism as such and abandon a considerable number of patients to people who might overlook serious diseases. Hes, like Tinling, urges a compromise, with one qualification—that a prior search for somatic illness be made.

Snell (1967, p. 313) reinforces the need to consider Hoodoo beliefs in differential diagnosis: —

> If the physician fails to ask about hexing beliefs or otherwise invite open discussion of them, a serious potential obstacle exists to the achievement of a therapeutic rapport. The patient may feel that if the doctor does not know what is really causing his symptoms he cannot possibly help him.

If indeed such a rapport can be obtained, Snell suggests, " Using hypnosis can be an effective, ethical technique " (p. 311).

Weidman (1975) extends the ramifications of Hoodoo into the boundaries of general medicine. Such beliefs, she notes, have been found not only in psychiatric cases but *in pediatric and general cases.* A recent well-documented instance from *Family Medicine* of psychogenic death from such beliefs provided a case in point.

Other cases have been reported, adding further proof of psychosomatic effects. Noel (see Michaelson 1972) used calcium gluconate in the treatment of his " hexed " patients whose manifest disorders he described as " psychophysiologic—not unlike colitis or gastric ulcers" (p. 58). One of Wintrob's (1972) North American patients died of what he terms " hex death;" another became asymptomatic and was discharged after being treated by a " root-doctor." On the basis of this clinical experience, Wintrob advised physicians that sensitivity to culturally determined beliefs and practices of patients whose ethnic and social class background differs from that of the treatment personnel is crucial to accurate assessment of those patients' illness, whether medical or psychological. In evaluating, the doctor must take into account folk beliefs and folk-medicine no less than interpersonal stresses and intrapsychic factors. The lesson is clear: *to ignore any of these focuses is to invite clinical error.*

Young (1976, p. 6) states the transcultural problem as follows: —

> The interests of sick people, curers and people who worry that they may become sick are dominated by a medical paradigm. This means that they frame their questions and organize their behavior in order to identify, remove, arrest, alleviate, or prevent the disease symptoms that have intruded

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or threaten to intrude into everyday life. In brief, their interests focus on the *efficacy* of medical beliefs and practices. Because a people's beliefs and practices about prophylaxis, diagnosis and therapy constitute the greatest part of any society's efforts to understand and deal with sickness, they must be the indispensable *materia prima* of the anthropologist who wants to study sickness.

Young maintains that going beyond the medical paradigm of a particular people and using the Western or Euro-American paradigm to evaluate all other medical systems is faulty for two reasons: (1) analysts can only deal with their medical matters in a fragmentary way, and (2) while this paradigm can explain why people hold certain beliefs, it cannot explain why other sorts of belief and practices persist.

Young (p. 6) further maintains that an expansion of the meaning of illness may be necessary: —

> How can the field of interest be defined without the Western paradigm? Although it is reasonable enough to say that beliefs and behavior can be defined as "medical" when they somehow refer to sickness, if we leave the matter here we also have our assumptions implicit. The question which should be asked is: What, precisely, does "sickness" mean? The everyday definition of the word will not do since it has evolved out of the practical traditions of the Western healing arts and has taken its form within the institutional framework of the Western medical profession. What is needed is a concept of sickness that is consistent with the sorts of analytical concepts with which anthropologists study other institutions or ethnographic categories. It should be useful for cross-cultural comparisons and it should deal with facts that are examples of social behavior.

CONCLUSIONS AND RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS

One can safely conclude that little is truthfully or systematically known about the Hoodoo doctor and his healing techniques and powers or of the overall belief system that supports Hoodoo. This should not warrant continued disregard for the abilities of Hoodoo doctors by physicians; on the contrary, it should *stimulate research possibilities.* However, such research would require of its participants a readiness to examine their own culture (Murphy 1973). Murphy (p. 716) adds: —

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> A start is being made with the subject, particularly by White Northern American therapists treating Negro patients, but it is only a start. If transcultural psychiatry could show how much the therapist's cultural unconscious is affecting his perception of the patient and his problems, and show also how to handle these feelings, this might be the greatest contribution which transcultural studies could make to general psychiatry at this time.

Tinling suggests clinicians may now be able to observe psycho-physiological changes in the hexed patient rather than rely on poorly documented reports from remote areas. At this point, it is true, there have been no sound ethnological or ethno-psychiatric studies made which answer such necessary informational needs as: the cultural conditions under which Hoodoo exists and operates; objective analysis or culturally-induced stress, emotional economy; culturally-approved cathartic outlets for this stress and consequent types and forms of disorders; intrafamilia-personal factors; psychophharmacological aspects (*materia medica* aspects); psychophysiological changes; theory of illness and statistical data on the use, and timing, in the course of illness when the Hoodoo doctor and/or M.D. is contacted. Information of a purely ethnological nature has also not been widely obtained.

However, psychophysiological changes in the hexed patient can be fully observed and documented by fieldworkers despite claims to the contrary. In the continuing discussions on the etiology of Voodoo death, Lex (1974) maintains that revival of the question indicates that ethnographers either lack knowledge of autonomic systems functioning or disavow the significance of the autonomic nervous system in human behavior. However, she strongly contends (p. 822) that

> empirical testing of the explanation of death by suggestion—the practitioner's manipulation of the autonomic nervous system through the victim's cognitive apprehensions of witchcraft—should neither be difficult nor require sophisticated laboratory apparatus. Pupillary constriction, easily observable and indicative of parasympathetic activation, provides one ready diagnostic for field workers; the amount of saliva, of perspiration, degree of muscle tonicity and skin pallor in an individual are also discernible without complicated instruments.

Transcultural psychiatry has already learned much from American Indian therapists. To cite only a few examples, Opler's "Ute Indian Dream Analysis," Jilek's (1974) *Salish Indian Mental Health and Culture Changes,* and, perhaps the

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most provocative, Johnson and Proskauer's (1974) study of "Hysterical Psychosis in a Prepubescent Navajo Girl." This 11-year-old girl received treatment from both a shaman and a Euro-American psychiatrist working co-operatively. This latter approach provides an ideal model; but the goal should not be replacement of the indigenous therapist or his co-operation as an "associate therapist" in the hospital setting, but rather a *peaceful coexistence.* Such a condition has already been reported by Bergman (1973) in his involvement in the establishment and training program of a Navajo school for medicinemen. It may soon be possible, given more such advances, to develop similar programs for Hoodoo.

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Journals Received

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW

Published quarterly by the Centre for Migration Studies, Washington D.C. Vol. XI, No. 1, 1977. Price $5.00.

NEUE ANTHROPOLOGIE

Published by Gesellschaft für Biologische Anthropologie Eugenik und Varhaltenforschung, Hamburg, West Germany. Vol. 5, Nos. 2, 3, 1977.

ALASKA

Published monthly by Northwest Publishing Company, Anchorage, Alaska. Vol. XLIII, Nos. 6, 7, 1977.

HUMAN BEHAVIOUR

Published monthly by Manson Western Corporation, Los Angeles, California 90025. Vol. 6, Nos. 5, 6, 7, 1977. Price $1.50.

ETHNOLOGY

Published quarterly by University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260, U.S.A. Vol. XVI, No. 2, 1977. Price $10.00.

SOUTH AFRICA INTERNATIONAL

Published quarterly by the South African Foundation, P.O. Box 7006, Johannesburg. Vol. 7, No. 4, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1977. Price R1.00.

TERZO MONDO

Published by Il Centro Studi Terzo Mondo, 20129 Milan. Vol. X, No. 34, 1977. Price LI. 500.

REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS POLITICOS

Published by the Instituto de Estudios Politicos, Madrid 8, Spain. No. 212, 1977. Price $3.50.

POPULATION

Revue Bimestrielle de l'Institut National d'Etudes Demographiques, Paris. Vol. 32, No. 3, 1977. Price F22.00.

JOURNAL OF RACIAL AFFAIRS

Published by the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs, Pretoria. Vol. 28, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 1977.

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Published by Giannini Editore, Naples. Vol. XXV, 1976.

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Journal of the Italian Committee for the Study of Population Problems, and the Italian Society of Eugenics, Rome. Vol. XXXII, No. 3-4.

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Book Reviews

SCOTLAND IN EUROPE: A STUDY IN RACE RELATIONS

By Olive M. Squier, in three volumes. Graphic Publications, Inverness, 1976. Pp. 246, six plates, paper covers with charts of dynasties. Price £5.75.

This book deals with Scots history from the earliest times and, in doing so, discusses the Celtic Church and its dependence from that of England and Rome, and goes on to trace Scots history down to the present time.

It is, on the whole, an excellent work, putting the Scottish point of view, and not as an appendage of English history. It brings out the relations with France and the wide intermarriages with the continental monarchies, as well as the large armies (for those days) which the Scots fielded on the Continent, such as in support of Joan of Arc.

I doubt, however, if the writer is correct in saying that the Estates of Parliament were representative of all classes. They were composed of the Church, the peers, barons and freeholders, and the royal burghs themselves, usually with councils formed from the nobles. However she is right, in so far as the Estates were nearer to the people than the English Parliament, and so it enacted many laws which were beneficial to them—such as on education, and on assistance for the poor in litigation. At the other end of the social stratum what Parliament, other than the Scots Estates, made it obligatory before the Reformation to send the eldest sons of the barons to school and to go on from there for three years at the university?

All through the period of the Wars of the Roses in England, when Parliament was scarcely consulted, the Scottish Estates were in constant session. Among other tasks it codified Scots law, and ensured that the poor received justice (p. 136). Trade was improved and the coinage matters despatched. In the reign of James IV (as in that of James I) Scotland was a power in Europe.

These three volumes have to be read to be appreciated. They throw new light on the Scots and their affairs, and give an entirely new perspective of history, without which it is impossible to understand the past, or indeed the present.

R. GAYRE OF GAYRE

RACE DIFFERENCES IN INTELLIGENCE

By John C. Loehlin, Gardner Lindzey and J. N. Spuhler. W. H. Freeman. San Francisco, 1975. Pp. 380. Price $9.00 (paperback).

This impressive volume, prepared under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Biological Bases of Social Behavior, is a comprehensive presentation of the available evidence bearing on the extent and causes of ethnic differences in intelligence as measured by mental tests. It contains a great deal of additional and cognate material, such as a critical summary of the mathematical formulations of the concept of hereditability and the efforts to approximate this coefficient through comparison of I.Q. similarities of pairs of one-egg and pairs of two-egg twins; presentation of data on ethnic differences in the structure of intelligence, and an unusually thorough treatment of the relationship between specific nutritional deficiencies, occurring at different periods in fetal and infantile growth, and brain-size and I.Q. In dealing with the latter problem, for example, the authors point out that the experience of the Dutch *hongerwinter* in 1944-45, during which a Nazi embargo on land transport to western Netherlands caused widespread maternal starvation,

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does not necessarily disprove the hypothesis that severe fetal malnutrition may stultify brain growth.

The prior excellent nutritional state of Dutch women may have enabled their infants to survive intact an experience of nutritional deprivation which could cause permanent and severe brain damage among chronically malnourished and undernourished poor populations.

The work under review approaches controversial issues with such great scientific caution as to make its conclusions ambivalent and tentative on almost all matters. It is valuable for the vast amount of research material which the authors have studied, critically analyzed and recapitulated with admirable accuracy and brevity. For example, Loehlin *et al* point out that, while the most authoritative studies of comparative Negro and Caucasoid intelligence in the United States report an I.Q. difference of about 15 points in favor of the whites, these findings, which are almost always based on testing of schoolchildren, are not recapitulated in the most comprehensive testings of adult intelligence ever attempted in the United States. The latter are, of course, the mental testings of military recruits for the U.S. armed forces. These showed for the Second World War (Davenport, 1946) that the Black recruits averaged 23 I.Q. points (1.52 standard deviations) below the Whites. Twenty years later, after the most massive governmental and private effort to improve the educational, cultural, social, political and economic conditions of Negroes ever attempted by any nation at any time in history, Vietnam Negro recruits tested at exactly the same level—23 I.Q. points below the Whites (Karpinos, 1966). This finding suggests the intriguing possibility that we may have all been somewhat naive in assuming that one can realistically say that the I.Q. of one ethnic group is X points above or below the norm of its society. For this implies that different ethnic stocks have similar rates of mental development. It seems quite possible, if not probable, that genetic differences may prescribe variations in rate of growth between races—just as some people are incapable, regardless of stimulus, of actually understanding differential calculus or grandmaster chess combinations—and that hence a strictly accurate view of things might define the I.Q. relationship between two races as a function which varies with age.

The book under review will be of little value to readers who approach the subject of race differences in intelligence with the hope that science will validate their preconceptions, whether the latter be environmentalist or hereditarian. It is of great value to serious students of this complex problem who are interested in weighing the evidence.

NATHANIEL WEYL

THE EDGE OF THE FOREST

By E. Richard Sorenson. Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington, 1976. Pp. 280, 150 figures, 16 maps, eight tables. Price $18.50.

This is an excellent work, using the stills from film photography to illustrate these people of New Guinea. It lacks, as do nearly all such modern works, any clear statement of the races to which the native peoples belong, and although it has a section on linguistics, does not clearly define their position. It has, of course, a section on the genetics (based on blood groups). While these help us up to a point, they are not very satisfactory in sorting out the ethnological groundwork, especially where a limited number of genetic factors are concerned which come from more than one racial element. In those cases the blood groups can give almost any kind of result. For this reason we believe that a mere treatment on blood groups is not enough.

These are defects in an otherwise well produced work. As far as we can see the people have Australoid as well as Negroid or Melanesian blood.

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This is brought out by the baldness of the men—a feature not so common in the Negroid and probably due to the infiltration of the Australoid. The tendency to long hair in some is also evidence of Australoid blood.

Dr Sorenson made five field investigations in seven years during which he perfected his field technique.

The theory of linking Kuru disease with the cannibalism practised by the women is certainly worthy of serious investigation.

For anyone wishing to gain a greater insight into the Fore people of New Guinea this book is an essential work.

R. GAYRE OF GAYRE

THE THIRTEENTH TRIBE: THE KHAZAR EMPIRE AND ITS HERITAGE

Pp. 255. By Arthur Koestler. G. Hutchinson, London, 1976. Frontispiece, maps and three figures.

This book has created something of a sensation but, to me, the facts in it have been known throughout my ethnological life. However, in so far as Arthur Koestler has drawn these together in a most readable form it is a serious contribution to our knowledge. The fact is that a significant part of Jews are descended, as Ashkenazim, from the Khazars. The minority element of Jewry are the Sephardim. These are the real Jews but they form a small minority among the whole.

However, all the works dealing with Eastern Europe and the Huns, Magyars, Bulgars, as well as the Khazars stress that there is Caucasoid and Mongoloid origin. This I believe to be a mistake. There was a wide "shatter-belt" between the Aryans on the west and the true Mongoloid in the east, which was occupied by such tribes, which in my opinion were as "European" as the Aryans. Their language was different, being non-Aryan, agglutinative and related to the Mongolian, but this had been imposed on yellow peoples to the east and was an incipient form of the original Caucasoid tongues.

The weakest part of the book is towards the end, where Koestler ventures into anthoropolgy and relies, among others, on Juan Comas and the U.N.E.S.C.O. publication. Comas is no authority in this field, always finding evidence for miscegenation. After the examination of his work by James Gregor, in the MANKIND MONOGRAPHS, this is self-evident. The fact is that while the Ashkenazim Jews do show a mixture with the people among whom they have been long-settled, they also show a continuity of characters as well—which are Armenoid. Thus the "nostrility" of the Jew, with the tendency to a flat-footed type of walk, and squat appearance, are not only Jewish but belong to other branches of the Armenoid stock as well. However, they are more clearly developed among the Jews than among other peoples. Indeed, some of these Armenoid characters can be traced to the Jews of the exile. Therefore, they inherited the characters of a very wide-ranging racial group, which stretched from Palestine to Khazeria, in southern Russia. The Sephardim, although sometimes having these characters, are often of a more Mediterranean, and sometimes Nordic, strain.

The author is, however, undoubtedly right in saying that the Khazars form the basic ingredient of the Ashkenazim, and these are, to use a biblical expression, from Japhet. Japhetic, as I have shown, does not mean Mongoloid (yellow) but merely Alpino-Armenoid. In this they differ from the Sephardim who are of Shem strain—which in ultimate was originally Nordic, although in time much mixed with Mediterranean (Hamitic).

It is a good book and worthy of study.

R. GAYRE OF GAYRE

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PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND ARCHAEOLOGY

By P. Hammond. Collier-Macmillan Publishers, London 1976. Pp. 359, numerous illustrations and figures. Price £4.74 (paperback).

This book is good in parts. But where Professor Tobias beats the big drum of anti-racism it is made valueless. It is an attack on South Africa, and all those who are against "bussing" in the United States, which has no part in an objective work of this sort. He attacks Professor George, Messrs Swan and Putnam, Professor Hofmeyr and others. It is a piece of special pleading which, on the whole, is the disgrace of certain scientific writing of our age.

R. GAYRE OF GAYRE

THE MYSTIC MANDRAKE

By C. J. S. Thompson. Gale Research Company, Detroit, first published by Rider and Company, London, 1934. Reprinted 1975. Pp. 253. Price $16.00.

The Gale Research Company have recently issued a reprint edition of *The Mystic Mandrake*. The mandrake root was at one time believed to possess occult powers. A lengthy folklore has surrounded this plant from the earliest times. C. J. S. Thompson (former Curator of the Historical Collection of the Museum, Royal College of Surgeons, England) traces the history of the mandrake from its earliest appearance through many countries and cults. He discusses the mandrake in ancient Egypt, Greece and China; demonology and plants; its place in the Middle Ages; the gallows legend; in drama and poetry; and finally the medicinal and occult properties which have been attributed to it. The mandrake was used in ancient times as an anaesthetic and in Roman times for those crucified —and this is the basis of the account of the wine given to Christ. Within the last century it has been found to be a powerful drug.

THE HARIM AND THE PURDAH: STUDIES OF ORIENTAL WOMEN

By Elizabeth Cooper. Gale Research Company, Detroit, 1975 reprint of the 1915 work. Pp. 309. Price $15.00.

This is a treatment in depth by Elizabeth Cooper of all aspects of the harim, purdah, and other forms of seclusion of women in Egypt, Burma, China, and Japan.

Sympathetic to the women of the East, the author deals with the Eastern view of purdah and how it differs from the Western view. She is to be commended for attempting to understand the Eastern point of view. The Westerner might look upon seclusion as a form of slavery, but to most Eastern women it is a form of protective care. The contrast between the Near and Far East (of China and Japan) is provided. Contrary to general belief it seems evident from this book that the women of the harim and the purdah led very useful lives centred on the home and family.

THE GODDESSES OF CHALDAEA, SYRIA AND EGYPT

By Lawrence Durdin-Robertson, illustrated by Anna Durdin-Robertson. Cesara Publications, Enniscorthy, Eire, 1975. Pp. 440.

This book is given over to a description of each goddess. Of course, these could come together from different traditions so that they are duplicated under different names. One small point is that the same names are traceable through Semitic and Aryan speech, perhaps witnessing to the original unity, no matter how remotely, of those two linguistic systems.

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His accounts of such as Astarti (with which is associated Ishtar) is particularly good.

The author refers to the Witch of Endor. But this is wrong as it is the Woman of Endor who was a medium. In calling up Samuel she did not necessarily call him up from sheol or hell, but from the place of departed spirits, which is different.

DEMOGRAPHIC ANTHROPOLOGY: QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES

Edited by Ezra B. W. Zubrow. A School of American Research Book, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, 1976. Pp. 299, 30 figures, 66 tables. Price $20.00.

This is a detailed work, each section of which is written by a distinguished writer. It deals with, for instance, population growth in the Old World prehistory, *nunamiut* (Eskimo) demographic history, matrilateral implications of structural cross-cousin marriage, population dynamics at Grasshopper Pueblo (Arizona), the maximum opportunity for natural selection in some populations, childhood association, sexual attraction and fertility in Taiwan, and stability and instability.

This is based largely on a mathematical analysis in many cases, but it does indicate a possible interpretation of these matters. It may, however, go too far in this direction—time will show.

Books Received

IDENTITE CULTURELLE ET FRANCOPHONE DANS LES AMERIQUES

Published by the International Centre for Research on Bilingualism. Les Presses de l'Université Laval, Quebec, 1976. Pp. 290. Contains articles in English and French on this important subject.

FAMILIES AND FAMILY THERAPY

By Salvador Minuchin. Tavistock Publications, London, 1977. Pp. 268 (paperback). This is a rapidly growing subject and will be of great interest to psychiatrists, physicians and counsellors.

NINE MAYAN WOMEN: A VILLAGE FACES CHANGE

By Mary Elmendorf. Schenkman Publishing Company Inc., John Wiley and Sons, New York, London, Sydney, Toronto, 1976. Pp. 159, 13 illustrations. This is a study of Mayan women, especially under conditions of change. It is worth reading. The authoress notes the feeling of harmony in their lives as compared with the mestizo villagers (p. 125).

LANGUAGE NEEDS OF MINORITY GROUP CHILDREN

By June Derrick. N.F.E.R. Publishing Company, Windsor, Berkshire, 1977. Pp. 59. Price £2.10. The author traces the way in which the linguistic needs of non-English speaking minority group children have been perceived and provided for within the state education system up to the present day. She focuses on children for whom English is a second language and in particular stresses the need for a renewed effort to help learners of all ages to achieve real mastery of English, as this is still the key to academic and social achievement.

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